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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 




STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
 
 Appellant Sidney Lundy suffered a heart attack while a 
patron at appellee's casino, TropWorld Casino ("TropWorld"), in 
4 
Atlantic City, New Jersey.  While he survived, Lundy was left 
with permanent disabilities.  Lundy and his wife here appeal from 
a summary judgment entered against them by the district court. 
Their appeal raises two issues:  (1) what duty, if any, did 
TropWorld owe under New Jersey law to provide medical care to 
Lundy, and (2) whether the Lundys were entitled to amend their 
complaint to include an additional defendant, Dr. Dominic 
Carlino.0 
 The district court held that TropWorld's duty is, at 
most, to provide basic first aid to the patron when the need 
becomes apparent and to take reasonable steps to procure 
appropriate medical care.  Because the court found no evidence 
that TropWorld was negligent in carrying out this duty to Lundy, 
it granted TropWorld's motion for summary judgment.  With regard 
to the Lundys' motion to amend, the court found that the 
amendment would not relate back to the time of the filing of the 
complaint under Rule 15(c) and, accordingly, that the alleged 
claim against Dr. Carlino would be barred by limitations.   We 
will affirm. 
 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 On August 3, 1989, Lundy, a 66 year old man with a 
history of coronary artery disease, was patronizing TropWorld 
Casino.  While Lundy was gambling at a blackjack table, he 
                     
0The proposed amendment would have added both Dr. Carlino and Dr. 
Domenic Frank Carlino, a Professional Association.  For 
simplicity, we will refer to both as Dr. Carlino. 
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suffered cardiac arrest and fell to the ground unconscious. Three 
other patrons quickly ran to Lundy and began to assist him. The 
first to reach him was Essie Greenberg ("Ms. Greenberg"), a 
critical care nurse.  Ms. Greenberg was soon joined by her 
husband, Dr. Martin Greenberg ("Dr. Greenberg"), who is a 
pulmonary specialist.  The third individual who aided Lundy did 
not disclose his identity, but he indicated to Dr. Greenberg that 
he was a surgeon.  During his deposition, Dr. Greenberg stated 
that, when he first arrived on the scene, Lundy was unresponsive, 
not breathing, and without a pulse.  Dr. Greenberg testified that 
he, his wife, and the surgeon immediately began to perform 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation ("CPR") on Lundy. 
 Meanwhile, the blackjack dealer at the table where 
Lundy had been gambling pushed an emergency "call" button at his 
table which alerted TropWorld's Security Command Post that a 
problem existed.  The Security Command Post is electronically 
designed to designate the location from which such alarms are 
triggered and record the time that the alarm is sounded.  The 
alarm was recorded as being received at 10:57 p.m.  Noting that 
the source of the alarm was "Pit 3," a Security Command Post 
employee notified by phone the security post located on the 
casino floor near where Lundy had suffered his cardiac arrest.   
At 10:59 p.m., the Security Command Post employee sent radio 
directions to all of the guards on the casino floor requesting 
that they each go to Lundy's location.   
 A sergeant in TropWorld's security force and a 
TropWorld security guard arrived at the blackjack table 
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apparently within fifteen seconds of their receiving the radio 
message from the Security Command Post.  The Greenbergs and the 
unidentified surgeon were already assisting Lundy.  Upon 
arriving, the security guard called the Security Command Post on 
her hand-held radio and requested that someone contact the casino 
medical station, which was located one floor above the casino. 
Several witnesses agree that Nurse Margaret Slusher ("Nurse 
Slusher"), the nurse who was on-duty at the casino medical 
station at the time, arrived on the scene within a minute or two 
of being summoned.  As soon as Nurse Slusher arrived, she 
instructed the security guards to call for an ambulance. 
TropWorld's records indicate that an ambulance was summoned at 
11:00 p.m.  
 Nurse Slusher brought with her an ambu-bag,0 oxygen, 
and an airway.0  She did not, however, bring an intubation kit0 
to the scene.  Dr. Greenberg testified that he asked Nurse 
Slusher for one and she told him that it was TropWorld's "policy" 
not to have an intubation kit on the premises.  Dr. Greenberg 
                     
0Dr. Greenberg testified that an ambu-bag is a "device that's 
utilized to assist in respiration when a person is either unable 
to breathe on his own or is having difficulty breathing . . .. 
It's usually a cylindrical-sort-of-shaped plastic bag with a face 
mask attached to it that is applied over the person's mouth and 
nose, and subsequent pressure on the bag will allow for air to be 
entered into the person's nose and mouth . . . . It's [a] purely 
mechanical [device]."  App. 213-14. 
0The device known as an airway is a plastic apparatus that keeps 
the mouth open and holds the tongue in place.  App. 165. 
0According to Dr. Greenberg, an intubation kit consists of 
equipment that is used to insert an endotracheal tube into an 
individual, thereby establishing a more efficient airway than 
that which can be established with an ambu-bag. 
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also noted that Nurse Slusher told him that she previously worked 
at a different casino which did have an intubation kit in its 
medical station, and that she had requested one here as well. 
Nurse Slusher testified at her deposition that some of the 
equipment normally found in an intubation kit was stocked in 
TropWorld's medical center,0 but that she did not bring this 
equipment with her because she was not qualified to use it. 
 Nurse Slusher proceeded to assist the three patrons in 
performing CPR on Lundy.  Specifically, Nurse Slusher placed the 
ambu-bag over Lundy's face while the others took turns doing 
chest compressions.  The ambu-bag was connected to an oxygen 
source.  Dr. Greenberg testified that he was sure that air was 
entering Lundy's respiratory system and that Lundy was being 
adequately oxygenated during the period when he was receiving 
both CPR treatment and air through the ambu-bag.  Dr. Greenberg 
went on to say that the only reason he had requested an 
intubation kit was "[t]o establish an airway and subsequently 
provide oxygen in a more efficient manner."  App. 228.   
 The TropWorld Security Command Post radio log reflects 
that an Emergency Medical Technician ("EMT") unit arrived at 
TropWorld by ambulance at approximately 11:03 p.m.  The EMT's 
report lists 11:02 p.m. as the time of arrival.  Based on the 
fact that he performed CPR "for what seemed like an extensive 
amount of time," Dr. Greenberg estimated that "at least twenty 
                     
0Nurse Slusher testified that she did not bring either the 
laryngoscope or endotracheal tubes with her, which, according to 
Dr. Greenberg, are pieces of equipment normally found in an 
intubation kit.   
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minutes" elapsed between the time Lundy suffered cardiac arrest 
and the time the EMT unit arrived at Pit 3.  App. 220.   
 Upon the arrival of the EMT unit, a technician, with 
the help of the two doctor patrons, attempted to intubate Lundy 
using an intubation kit brought by the EMT unit.  Dr. Greenberg 
claimed that, due to Lundy's stout physique and rigid muscle 
tone, it was a very difficult intubation, and that there were at 
least a half dozen failed attempts before the procedure was 
successfully completed.  After intubation, Lundy regained a pulse 
and his color improved.  According to EMT reports, the ambulance 
departed from TropWorld with Lundy at 11:27 p.m., and it arrived 
at the Atlantic City Medical Center, which is located less than 
one mile from TropWorld, at 11:29 p.m. 
 The Lundys filed this diversity action against 
TropWorld less than two weeks before the applicable statute of 
limitations expired on August 3, 1991.0  TropWorld filed an 
answer to the Lundys' complaint on September 12, 1991, along with 
a third-party complaint against a Dr. Carlino.  TropWorld alleged 
that, in the event it were held liable to the Lundys, it would be 
entitled to either contribution or indemnification from Dr. 
Carlino.   
 TropWorld had a contract with Dr. Carlino providing 
that he would run an in-house medical station to supply medical 
services for TropWorld's employees, guests, and patrons in cases 
of work-related injuries and injuries or sicknesses occurring on 
                     
0The applicable limitations period is two years.  See N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 2A:14-2 (West 1987). 
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the premises.  The contract required that Dr. Carlino provide a 
licensed physician on the casino premises for five hours each 
day, and a physician "on-call" for the rest of the day.  Any 
physician selected by Dr. Carlino was subject to dismissal by 
TropWorld for good cause only.  Furthermore, Dr. Carlino was 
obligated to have a registered nurse present in the medical 
station during the hours that the casino was open.  Each nurse 
was to be chosen by Dr. Carlino, but was subject to dismissal by 
TropWorld for any reason whatsoever.  The contract specifically 
stated that Dr. Carlino's status would be that of an independent 
contractor and the doctors and nurses at the station were to be 
employees of Dr. Carlino.  In August of 1989, Nurse Slusher was a 
registered, licensed nurse with over fifteen years of experience. 
 Dr. Carlino's contract with TropWorld required him to 
stock the medical station with certain designated medical 
hardware, including a Puritan-Bennett Manual Resuscitator (i.e. 
an ambu-bag with oxygen), intravenous solutions for 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation, a cardiac board, an oxygen 
cylinder with nasal canula and mask, and a laryngoscope with 
intubation tube.0  The contract, which was signed on December 11, 
1987, required that medical services be performed for a period of 
two years in exchange for a flat fee from TropWorld. 
 According to the Lundys, they did not know that Nurse 
Slusher was employed by an organization other than TropWorld 
until TropWorld filed its third party complaint against Dr. 
                     
0According to Dr. Greenberg, these are all items that are 
typically included in an intubation kit. 
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Carlino on September 11, 1991.  By this time, however, the two-
year statute of limitations had expired.  Eight months later, the 
Lundys filed a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) to amend their 
original complaint to add third party defendant Dr. Carlino as an 
original party defendant.  This motion was granted by a 
magistrate judge on July 8, 1992.   
 Upon the completion of discovery, TropWorld filed a 
motion for summary judgment which was joined by Dr. Carlino.  Dr. 
Carlino also filed an appeal from the order of the magistrate 
judge granting the Lundys' Rule 15(c) motion.  The district court 
granted the motion for summary judgment and reversed the 
magistrate's order granting the Rule 15(c) motion. 
 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION 
 The district court held that TropWorld had fulfilled 
its duty to Lundy under New Jersey law.  The court found that 
TropWorld had "immediately summoned medical attention for Mr. 
Lundy once it became aware of his need for it."  App. 651-52. 
Additionally, the court stated that "the very fact that TropWorld 
contracted with Dr. Carlino is evidence that it fulfilled its 
duty to aid injured patrons by having at least a registered nurse 
available, trained in emergency care, who could immediately size 
up a patron's medical situation and summon appropriate emergency 
medical personnel and equipment by ambulance to respond to the 
patrons's (sic) emergency needs."  App. 652.  The court also 
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found that the Lundys' case failed for "lack of proof of 
deviation from the standard of medical care."0  App. 655. 
 Additionally, the court held that New Jersey's Good 
Samaritan Statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:62A-1 (West 1993), 
shielded TropWorld and its employees from liability for any acts 
or omissions they took while rendering care in good faith to 
Lundy.  Finally, the court held that the casino could not be held 
liable for any of Nurse Slusher's actions because she was an 
employee of independent contractor Dr. Carlino, rather than an 
employee of TropWorld.      
 Turning to the Lundys' Rule 15 motion to add Dr. 
Carlino as a party defendant, the district court found that 
neither the version of Rule 15(c) in effect at the time of the 
filing of the Lundys' motion nor the subsequently amended version 
of that Rule permits a plaintiff, after the running of the 
                     
0The Lundys presented the court with a report from an expert 
which stated, inter alia: 
  
(1) It is correct to say that intubation 
allowed for an improved exchange of oxygen 
that accounted for his improvement in color. 
(2) It is correct to say that, had the 
intubation equipment been available to the 
pulmonary physician who was doing CPR, Mr. 
Lundy's condition would have been better. (3) 
It is also correct that, to a reasonable 
degree of medical certainty, had Mr. Lundy 
been intubated sooner, there would have been 
a decreased likelihood of harm.  
 
The court found that even if it accepted the Lundys' expert's 
opinion as completely true, which it was required to do for the 
purposes of summary judgment, the expert in no way suggested that 
the standard of care that casino ownership must meet includes 
having an intubation kit on the premises.  The expert opinion 
addressed only causation and not duty.  App. 653-55. 
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statute of limitations, to add an entirely new defendant of whom 
the plaintiff had been unaware during the limitations period. The 
court stated that Rule 15(c) "applies only to problems of 
misnomer and misidentification and not the addition of an 
entirely different party."  App. 632.  Furthermore, the court 
held that, even if Rule 15(c) were interpreted as permitting the 
addition of previously unidentified parties, the Lundys' amended 
complaint did not relate back to their original complaint because 
Dr. Carlino did not receive notice of a claim by the Lundys 
against him within the 120-day period as required by subsection 
(3) of the Rule.   
 Our review of the district court's decision to grant 
summary judgment is plenary.  Wheeler v. Towanda Area Sch. Dist., 
950 F.2d 128, 129 (3d Cir. 1991).  Because the district court's 
decision regarding the Rule 15(c) motion was based on the court's 
interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we 
exercise plenary review of this decision as well.  International 
Union, UAW v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 917 F.2d 107, 110 (3d Cir. 
1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 921 (1991).0   
   III. TROPWORLD'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state that a court 
may grant summary judgment only if there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and if the moving party is subject to 
                     
0We exercise appellate jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  The district court had subject matter 
jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 based on 
diversity of citizenship between the parties and an amount in 
controversy in excess of $50,000.   
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judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  A dispute 
is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury 
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."  Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).  A fact is 
"material" when it "might affect the outcome of the suit under 
the governing law."  Id.  Disputes over facts which are 
irrelevant or unnecessary will not preclude a grant of summary 
judgment.  Id.   
 The initial burdens of informing the court of the basis 
for a motion for summary judgment and identifying the portions of 
the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact fall on the moving party.  Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).  If the moving party can 
satisfy these initial burdens, Rule 56(e) states that the 
nonmoving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of his [or her] pleadings, but his [or her] response  
. . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial."  Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 341 (3d 
Cir.) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1010 
(1985).  However, any reasonable inferences that can be drawn 
from the record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the 
party opposing the motion.  Sorba v. Pennsylvania Drilling Co., 
Inc., 821 F.2d 200, 202-03 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 
1019 (1988).  It is with this standard in mind that we review the 
district court's decision to grant TropWorld's motion for summary 
judgment. 
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 The Lundys cannot, and do not, claim that TropWorld was 
responsible in any way for Mr. Lundy's medical emergency.  Nor do 
they claim that TropWorld breached a duty to procure competent 
aid from the outside with reasonable expedition.  Rather, as we 
understand it, the Lundys advance two theories of liability 
against TropWorld.  First, the relationship between a casino and 
its patrons gives rise to a duty to provide medical care, and 
TropWorld breached this duty when it failed to have on-site the 
equipment and skilled personnel necessary to perform an 
intubation.  Second, TropWorld breached a voluntarily assumed 
duty by failing to provide Dr. Greenberg, upon his request, with 
the laryngoscope with intubation tube that was available in the 
medical station.  We will address each theory in turn.  Because 
there are no New Jersey Supreme Court cases which clearly 
delineate the duties owed by casino ownership to patrons 
suffering medical emergencies, we must predict how that court 
would rule on this question.  Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg College, 
989 F.2d 1360, 1366 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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A. 
 Generally, a bystander has no duty to provide 
affirmative aid to an injured person, even if the bystander has 
the ability to help.  See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and 
Keeton on the Law of Torts § 56, at 375 (5th ed. 1984).  New 
Jersey courts have recognized, however, that the existence of a 
relationship between the victim and one in a position to render 
aid may create a duty to render assistance. See, e.g., Praet v. 
Borough of Sayreville, 527 A.2d 486, 489 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1987).  In Szabo v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 40 A.2d 562 (N.J. 
Err. & App. 1945), for example, New Jersey's highest court held 
that, in the absence of a contract or statute, an employer 
generally has no duty to provide medical service to treat an ill 
or injured employee, even if the illness or injury was the result 
of the employer's negligence.  However, if the employee, while 
engaged in the work of his or her employer, sustains an injury 
rendering him or her helpless to provide for his or her own care, 
the employer must secure medical care for the employee.  Id. at 
563.  If a casino owner in New Jersey owes no greater duty to its 
patrons than an employer owes its employees while they are 
engaged in the employer's business, we think it clear that 
TropWorld did not fail in its duty to render assistance. 
 The Lundys insist, however, that TropWorld had a duty 
beyond that recognized in Szabo.  They urge specifically that the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey would adopt the rule set forth in the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A (1965).  Section 314A states 
in pertinent part:  
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(1) A common carrier is under a duty to its  
 passengers to take reasonable action 
 
(a) to protect them against unreasonable risk 
of physical harm, and  
 
(b) to give them first aid after it knows or 
has reason to know that they are ill or 
injured, and to care for them until they can 
be cared for by others. 
 
(2) An innkeeper is under a similar duty to 
its guests.  
 
(3) A possessor of land who holds it open to 
the public is under a similar duty to members 
of the public who enter in response to his 
invitation. 
 We think it likely that the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
would accept the principles enunciated in § 314A and would apply 
them in a case involving a casino and one of its patrons.  We 
need not so hold, however.  The pertinent commentary following  
§ 314A indicates that the duty "to take reasonable action . . . 
to give . . . first aid" in times of emergency requires only that 
carriers, innkeepers and landowners procure appropriate medical 
care as soon as the need for such care becomes apparent and 
provide such first aid prior to the arrival of qualified 
assistance as the carrier's, innkeeper's or landowner's employees 
are reasonably capable of giving.  Clearly, the duty recognized 
in § 314A does not extend to providing all medical care that the 
carrier or innkeeper could reasonably foresee might be needed by 
a patron.  Specifically, the commentary states:   
f.  The defendant . . . [i]n the case of an 
ill or injured person . . . will seldom be 
required to do more than give such first aid 
as he reasonably can, and take reasonable 
steps to turn the sick man over to a 
physician, or to those who will look after 
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him and see that medical assistance is 
obtained.   
 Nurse Slusher was a registered, licensed nurse who had 
been trained in emergency care and who had fifteen years of 
nursing experience.  The uncontradicted evidence was that, 
despite this training and experience, she was not competent to 
perform an intubation.  It necessarily follows that the duty 
which the Lundys insist the New Jersey Supreme Court would 
recognize in this case would require casinos to provide a full-
time on-site staff physician.  Certainly, maintaining on a full-
time basis the capability of performing an intubation goes far 
beyond any "first aid" contemplated by § 314A.  We are confident 
the New Jersey Supreme Court would decline to impose liability on 
TropWorld for failing to maintain that full-time capability. 
 
B. 
 The Lundys further claim that, even if there would 
otherwise be no duty to provide a level of care encompassing 
intubation, TropWorld voluntarily assumed a duty to provide such 
care and breached that duty by negligently failing to provide it. 
As we understand the argument, TropWorld voluntarily assumed this 
duty in two ways.  First, by contracting with Dr. Carlino to have 
a laryngoscope with intubation tube on the premises, TropWorld 
voluntarily assumed the duty of having it available for use on 
request.  Second, by voluntarily undertaking to assist Mr. Lundy, 
TropWorld assumed a duty to use due care in providing that 
assistance and breached this duty when Nurse Slusher failed to 
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bring the laryngoscope with intubation tube to Dr. Greenberg.  In 
connection with this second argument, the Lundys rely upon the 
principles outlined in § 324 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
which provides: 
 One who, being under no duty to do so, takes  
charge of another who is helpless adequately 
to aid or protect himself is subject to 
liability to the other for any bodily harm 
caused to him by 
  (a) the failure of the actor to exercise 
reasonable care to secure the safety of the 
other while within the actor's charge, or 
  (b) the actor's discontinuing his aid or 
protection, if by so doing he leaves the 
other in a worse position than when the actor 
took charge of him.   
 As we have indicated, TropWorld's medical center, as a 
result of its contract with Dr. Carlino, did have a laryngoscope 
with intubation tube as part of its inventory of equipment. Nurse 
Slusher did not bring this equipment with her when she was 
summoned to Pit 3, however.  She brought only that equipment that 
she was qualified to use:  the ambu-bag, oxygen, and an airway. 
At some point after her arrival on the scene, Dr. Greenberg asked 
for an intubation kit.  While the Lundys do not expressly so 
state, we understand their contention to be that Nurse Slusher 
should have returned to the medical center at this point and 
retrieved the intubation tube for Dr. Greenberg's use and 
TropWorld is liable for her failure to do so.  They suggest that 
her failure to do so was the result of an ill-considered 
19 
TropWorld policy that she was not permitted to use intubation 
equipment. 
 We reject the notion that TropWorld, by contracting 
with Dr. Carlino, voluntarily assumed a duty to Mr. Lundy it 
would not otherwise have had.  The Lundys have referred us to no 
New Jersey case law supporting this proposition and we have found 
none. 
 The Lundys' argument based on § 324 of the Restatement, 
ignores the fact that the principles restated therein have been 
materially altered by New Jersey's Good Samaritan Act, § 2A:62A-1 
N.J. Stat. Ann.  That Act provides that anyone "who in good faith 
renders emergency aid at the scene of an . . . emergency to the 
victim . . . shall not be liable for any civil damages as a 
result of acts or omissions by such person in rendering the 
emergency care."  We believe the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
would hold that this mandate protects TropWorld from liability in 
the situation before us. 
 The Lundys do not, and cannot, assert that there was 
bad faith here.0  Rather, they seek to avoid the effect of New 
                     
0Nurse Slusher's refusal to retrieve the intubation kit from her 
office does not constitute bad faith.  Indeed, the record paints 
a picture of a good faith effort to revive Lundy and to maintain 
his respiration and pulse pending the arrival of the emergency 
medical technicians.  The purpose of the Act is precisely to 
promote such commendable gratuitous undertakings as that 
exemplified by TropWorld.  See Praet, 527 A.2d at 489 ("[T]he 
grant of legislative immunity to a volunteer was designed, simply 
and obviously, to encourage gratuitous assistance by those who 
have no legal obligation to render it."); id., 527 A.2d at 488 
("'The purpose of [the Act] is to encourage the rendering of aid 
to injured persons at the scene of an accident or emergency 
20 
Jersey's Good Samaritan Act by relying on what is known as the 
"preexisting duty" exception to the Act.  Under this exception, 
the Act provides no immunity from liability if the duty allegedly 
breached by the volunteer was a duty that existed prior to the 
voluntary activity.  E.g., Praet v. Borough of Sayreville, 218 
N.J. Super. 218, 527 A.2d 486 (1987) (police officers who have a 
preexisting duty to render emergency assistance to a motorist 
trapped in a car may be held liable for failing to extricate 
motorist and prevent fire).  We do not believe the preexisting 
duty exception is applicable under New Jersey law in a situation, 
like the present one, where the preexisting duty is a limited one 
and the alleged negligence is the failure to provide a level of 
assistance beyond that required by the preexisting duty. 
 We think this becomes apparent when one focuses on the 
purposes of the Good Samaritan Act and the preexisting duty 
exception and on the nature of the preexisting duty in this case. 
The purpose of the Good Samaritan Act is to encourage the 
rendering of assistance to victims by providing that the 
voluntary rendering of aid will not give rise to any liability 
that would not otherwise exist.  The preexisting duty exception 
recognizes that fulfillment of this objective of the statute can 
be accomplished without the eradication of preexisting duties. 
 Nurse Slusher had no preexisting duty to Lundy apart 
from her role as an employee of TropWorld (or, arguably, as an 
employee of an independent contractor of TropWorld).  Nurse 
                                                                  
without fear of civil liability.'" (quoting legislative history 
of original bill)). 
21 
Slusher, if she had been a fellow patron, for example, would have 
had no preexisting duty obligation and she would have been fully 
protected by the Good Samaritan Act.  Thus, the only relevant 
preexisting duty for purposes of applying the Act under New 
Jersey law is the preexisting duty owed by TropWorld to Mr. 
Lundy.  That preexisting duty, as we have seen, was a duty 
limited to summoning aid and, in the interim, taking reasonable 
first aid measures.  It did not include the duty to provide the 
medical equipment and personnel necessary to perform an 
intubation.  It follows, we believe, that Nurse Slusher's conduct 
with respect to the providing or withholding of the intubation 
equipment on the premises was not conduct with respect to which 
she or TropWorld owed a preexisting duty to Lundy.  It further 
follows that, if TropWorld is responsible for the assistance 
voluntarily provided by Nurse Slusher, it is protected by the Act 
from liability arising from her alleged negligence in failing to 
provide that intubation equipment.0  Accordingly, we conclude 
                     
0At times, the Lundys appear to be arguing that TropWorld, by 
putting intubation equipment on its premises, voluntarily assumed 
a duty beyond its preexisting duty to take reasonable first aid 
measures and that TropWorld is, accordingly, liable for a breach 
of that voluntarily assumed duty.  If the Lundys do so argue, we 
believe there are two answers.  First, the Good Samaritan Act 
would protect TropWorld from liability arising from its voluntary 
activity.  Second, a decision voluntarily to provide intubation 
equipment for the use of physician employees of an independent 
contractor who were known to be qualified to use it does not 
constitute a decision voluntarily to provide such equipment to 
strangers who volunteer assistance at the site of an emergency. 
These decisions involve distinctly different considerations, and 
we are confident that the Supreme Court of New Jersey would not 
regard them as equivalent. 
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that TropWorld's motion for summary judgment was properly 
granted.  
  
IV.  THE LUNDYS' MOTION TO AMEND 
 Rule 15(c) sets forth the circumstances under which an 
amendment to a pleading will relate back to the date of the 
original pleading for limitations purposes.  Prior to December 1, 
1991, an amendment that "change[d] the party against whom a claim 
was asserted" related back to the date of the original complaint 
only if (1) "the claim or defense asserted in the amended 
pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set 
forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading," (2) 
within the period provided for commencing an action against  
the new party, the new party received such notice of the 
institution of the action that the new party would not be 
prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (3) within 
that same period, the new party knew or should have known that 
"but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party," 
the action would have been originally filed against him or her. 
An amendment to Rule 15(c) which became effective on December 1, 
1991, changed the second and third of these requirements by 
deleting the references to the period for commencement of an 
action and by substituting "the period provided by Rule 4(j) for 
the service of the summons and complaint."  Rule 4(j) provides 
that if the summons and complaint are not served "within 120 days 
of the filing of the complaint and the party on whose behalf such 
service was required cannot show good cause why service was not 
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made within that period, the action shall be dismissed."  The 
Lundys contend that their amended complaint adding Dr. Carlino 
relates back to the date of the original complaint under the 
amended version of Rule 15(c) because all of the requirements of 
the rule were met within 120 days of the filing of their original 
complaint.0 
 The 1991 amendment also added to Rule 15(c) a new 
subsection (c)(1) providing that an "amendment of the pleadings 
relates back to the date of the original pleading when (1) 
relation back is permitted by the law that provides the statute 
of limitations applicable to the action."  The Lundys urge that 
this provision is applicable to all amended complaints, including 
those that change the party against whom a claim is asserted.  We 
accept this contention for present purposes. 
 Because the current version of Rule 15(c) came into 
effect after the original complaint was filed here, but while the 
case was still pending, there is some question as to whether the 
previous version of the rule governs, or whether the current 
version of the rule should be retroactively applied.  However, 
because we believe that the Lundys' attempted amendment would not 
                     
0This case accordingly does not involve the issue of the 
circumstances under which the period for applying the second and 
third requirements may be longer than 120 days.  Specifically, 
the Advisory Committee Notes following Rule 15 state that "this 
rule allows not only the 120 days specified in [Rule 4] but also 
any additional time resulting from any extension ordered by the 
court pursuant to that rule, as may be granted, for example, if 
the defendant is a fugitive from service of the summons."  Here, 
the Lundys do not suggest that Dr. Carlino's knowledge was 
greater at some other potentially relevant point than it was 
during the 120 day period.  
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relate back to their original complaint under either version of 
Rule 15(c), we need not answer the question of retroactivity. 
 Dr. Carlino did not receive any notice of the 
institution of the Lundys' action within the applicable statute 
of limitations, which expired on August 3, 1991.  Therefore, the 
Lundys' amendment would clearly not relate back to the original 
complaint if the previous version of Rule 15(c) applies. 
 Analysis under the current version of Rule 15(c) is a 
bit more complicated, yet it leads us to the same result.  The 
complaint was filed on July 22, 1991, which was about two weeks 
before the expiration of the statute of limitations on August 3, 
1991.  The one hundred and twentieth day after the filing was 
November 19, 1991.  The Lundys correctly point out that Dr. 
Carlino had received TropWorld's cross-claim on September 12, 
1991 and had thus become aware of the existence of the suit at 
that time.  The Lundys further stress that Dr. Carlino answered 
the cross-claim on October 18, 1991, and undoubtedly had reviewed 
their original complaint prior to filing that answer.  It is 
their original complaint that the Lundys insist put Dr. Carlino 
on notice that "but for a mistake concerning identity of the 
proper party," the action would have been brought against him. 
Accordingly, we turn to that relatively brief complaint.  
 After identifying the parties and making the necessary 
jurisdictional allegation, the Lundys' complaint reads in 
relevant part: 
 2.  At all times material hereto, 
Defendant acted, and failed to act, by and 
through its agents, servants, work persons 
25 
and employees in the course and scope of 
employment. 
 
 3.  On or about August 3, 1989, while 
Plaintiffs were business invitees lawfully on 
Defendant's premises, Plaintiff, Sidney 
Lundy, suffered a cardiac arrest. 
 
 4.  At all time [sic] material hereto, 
Defendant, as the owner in possession of a 
hotel, restaurant and gambling complex open 
to the public, was under a duty to its 
business invitees to have proper first aid 
facilities and personnel available to its 
business invitees and was also under a duty 
to its business invitees to take reasonable 
action to render first aid to such business 
invitees, when necessary. 
 
 5.  At all time material hereto, 
Defendant knew, and had reason to know, that 
Plaintiff had suffered a cardiac arrest and 
required first aid, oxygen and other medical 
attention. 
 
 6.  Defendant negligently, recklessly 
and carelessly failed to perform its duty to 
Plaintiff by failing to have such emergency-
first aid facilities, oxygen or medical 
personnel available. 
 
 7.  Although Defendant telephoned for an 
ambulance to take Plaintiff to the hospital, 
it otherwise rendered no first aid or 
emergency medical treatment whatsoever to 
Plaintiff, despite his crucial need for same. 
 
 8.  Due to all the foregoing, Defendant 
increased the likelihood of harm to the 
Plaintiff. 
 
 9.  Due to all the foregoing, Defendant 
negligently, recklessly and carelessly caused 
serious and permanent bodily injuries to 
Plaintiff and caused aggravation and 
exacerbation of Plaintiff's injuries and 
hypoxic encephalopathy.   
App. 10-11. 
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 We agree with the Lundys that Dr. Carlino received 
notice of the existence of the litigation within 120 days of the 
filing of the complaint.  We cannot agree, however, with their 
position that during that period he "knew or should have known 
that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper 
party, the action would have been brought against" him.  Like the 
district court, we conclude to the contrary.0 
 The Lundys' complaint asserted a claim against 
TropWorld on the theory that "as the owner in possession of a  
. . . gambling complex open to the public" it had a duty to its 
business invitees that it breached by (1) failing to have 
"emergency-first aid facilities, oxygen or medical personnel 
available" and (2) by rendering "no first aid or emergency 
medical treatment whatsoever" to Mr. Lundy.  This may or may not 
have appeared to Dr. Carlino to be a viable theory of liability 
against TropWorld.  Clearly it must have communicated to him that 
the Lundys intended to sue someone else.  Dr. Carlino would not 
have been liable under the theory advanced in the complaint, 
                     
0The magistrate judge concluded that Dr. Carlino had reason to 
believe the Lundys, but for a mistake concerning the identity of 
the proper party, would have sued him.  Accordingly, the 
magistrate judge granted the Lundys' motion to amend under Rule 
15.  This ruling was dispositive of Dr. Carlino's statute of 
limitations defense and the district court, accordingly, was free 
to rule de novo on the issue presented by this third requirement 
of Rule 15(c).  Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).  We review the district 
court's finding on that issue under a clearly erroneous standard. 
Varlack v. SWC Caribbean, Inc., 550 F.2d 171, 174 (3d Cir. 1977). 
While the district court described the magistrate judge's 
conclusion as "clearly erroneous," it owed no deference to that 
conclusion.  Nor do we.  We do not disagree, however, with the 
district court's characterization of the magistrate judge's 
conclusion as being "clearly erroneous." 
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however, and we perceive no reason why it should have led Dr. 
Carlino to believe the Lundys intended to sue him and had failed 
to do so because of a mistake concerning identity.0 
 Where there is a basis for the plaintiff to assert 
liability against the party or parties named in a complaint and 
there is no reason for another party to believe that the 
plaintiff did anything other than make a deliberate choice 
between potential defendants, courts have consistently held that 
the third requirement of Rule 15(c)(3) is not met.  See, e.g., 
Lovelace v. O'Hara, 985 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1993) (complaint 
alleges theory of liability against public officer in official 
capacity; no basis for believing claim against official in 
                     
0This case does not require us to decide whether Rule 15(c) 
applies in a situation where a proposed defendant should have 
known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the 
proper party, the plaintiff would have sued both the original 
defendant and the proposed defendant.  We may assume that Rule 
15(c) does cover such a situation.  Dr. Carlino's only 
information, during the relevant period, concerning the Lundys' 
intent in filing their complaint was the information contained in 
that complaint.  The Lundys there complained only about an 
alleged failure to provide emergency equipment and personnel and 
about an alleged failure to provide any "emergency medical 
treatment whatsoever."  These allegations provide a basis for 
claims by the Lundys against TropWorld and possibly cross-claims 
by TropWorld against Dr. Carlino for breach of contract. However, 
the Lundys have suggested no legal theory under which these 
allegations could provide a basis for a claim by the Lundys 
against Dr. Carlino.  If there be such a theory, it is 
sufficiently creative that we do not believe Dr. Carlino should 
be held to have anticipated it.  As the district court stressed, 
there is no allegation in the Lundys' complaint that treatment of 
Mr. Lundy was undertaken by an employee of TropWorld who provided 
such treatment negligently.  Accordingly, we are not faced with 
the issue of whether Dr. Carlino should have known that, but for 
a mistake concerning the identity of the employer of an employee 
alleged to be negligent in the complaint, the Lundys should have 
sued both TropWorld and Dr. Carlino. 
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individual capacity intended); Hernandez Jimenez v. Calero 
Toledo, 604 F.2d 99, 103 (1st Cir. 1979) ("appellees could very 
well have believed that they were not named as parties in the 
original action for tactical reasons or because appellant lacked 
evidence of their alleged participation in the conspiracy when he 
filed the complaint"); Great Northeastern Lumber & Millwork Corp. 
v. Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Co., Inc., 785 F.Supp. 514, 
516 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (manufacturer of component part in product 
liability situation "may have believed plaintiff made a 
deliberate choice rather than a 'mistake' in deciding not to join 
[it]"). 
 This is such a case.  The complaint gave Dr. Carlino no 
reason during the relevant period to believe that the Lundys had 
intended to sue him.  Indeed, after TropWorld filed a cross-claim 
against him on September 12, 1991, and the Lundys failed during 
the remaining 51 days of the 120 day period to amend to join him, 
Dr. Carlino had affirmative reason to believe that the Lundys did 
not wish to assert liability against him. 
 Finally, we turn to the Lundys' contention that, 
because their amended complaint against Dr. Carlino relates back 
under New Jersey law, we should hold that it relates back here 
under the provisions of Rule 15(c)(1), as amended in 1991.   
 Rule 4:9-3 of the New Jersey Rules of Court states: 
When Amendments Relate Back 
 Whenever the claim or defense asserted 
in the amended pleading arose out of the 
conduct, transaction or occurrence set forth 
or attempted to be set forth in the original 
pleading, the amendment relates back to the 
date of the original pleading; but the court, 
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in addition to its power to allow amendments 
may, upon terms, permit the statement of a 
new or different claim or defense in the 
pleading.  An amendment changing the party 
against whom a claim is asserted relates back 
if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, 
within the period provided by law for 
commencing the action against him, the party 
to be brought in by amendment (1) has 
received such notice of the institution of 
the action that he will not be prejudiced in 
maintaining his defense on the merits, and 
(2) knew or should have known that, but for a 
mistake concerning the identity of the proper 
party, the action would have been brought 
against him. 
(emphasis added).  This provision is virtually identical to the 
original version of Rule 15(c).  Like that Rule, New Jersey's 
Rule 4:9-3 requires that for an amendment changing, or, 
presumably, adding a party to relate back, the new party must 
receive notice of the institution of the action prior to the 
running of the applicable statute of limitations.  See Townsend 
v. Great Adventure, 429 A.2d 601, 607 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1981) (an amendment adding an additional defendant did not relate 
back to the original complaint pursuant to Rule 4:9-3 when there 
was "no showing that [the new defendant] received notice within 
[the applicable statute of limitations] that any action had been 
instituted by [plaintiff] against any person for his injuries and 
losses.").  Because Dr. Carlino did not receive any notice of the 
Lundys' suit prior to the expiration of the statute of 
limitations, the Lundys' amendment does not relate back to their 
original complaint under New Jersey law.  Accordingly, we reject 
the Lundys' argument that their claim against Dr. Carlino relates 
30 
back to the date of their original complaint under Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 15(c), as amended in 1991. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 The judgment of the district court will be affirmed. 
1 
2 
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BECKER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part of the judgment and dissenting in part. 
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) was amended in 1991 "to prevent parties 
against whom claims are made from taking unjust advantage of otherwise inconsequential 
pleading errors to sustain a limitations defense."  FED. R. CIV. P. 15, advisory 
committee's note -- 1991 amendment.  I believe that the majority has lost sight of the 
motivation behind the 1991 amendment to Rule 15 as well as of the plain meaning of that 
Rule, and thereby has deprived the plaintiff of his day in court on the basis of a mere 
technicality.  I respectfully dissent from Part IV of the majority's opinion. 
 I concur with the majority, however, that Trop World was entitled to summary 
judgment on the issue of whether it breached a duty toward Lundy by not having more 
medical equipment and/or medically-trained personnel available in case of emergency, and 
hence I concur in much of Part III.  However, I write separately on the issue of Trop 
World's duties toward Lundy because I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the
Jersey Supreme Court would rule that, even had Trop World been Nurse Slusher's employer, 
Trop World would still be entitled to summary judgment.  While I agree with the majority 
that Trop World is not liable for Nurse Slusher's conduct only because she was employed by 
an independent contractor, I must discuss this point because if the majority is correct 
Dr. Carlino and Dr. Carlino, P.A. might be entitled to summary judgment even if they had 
been named as defendants from day one.0 
 
I.  THE 1991 AMENDMENT OF RULE 15(C) 
                     
0Lundy has not appealed the district court's rulings that Dr. Carlino and Dr. Carlino, 
P.A. were independent contractors and that this case does not fit into the exceptions New 
Jersey recognizes to nonliability for an independent contractor's conduct. 
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 On April 30, 1991, the Supreme Court recommended an amendment to Rule 15(c)
at the same time proposed an effective date of December 1, 1991.  The stimulus behind the 
amendment was the harsh result in Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 106 S. Ct. 2379 
(1986).  In that case the plaintiffs had filed a timely libel complaint against "Fortune" 
rather than against "Time, Incorporated", the owner of the Fortune trademark. Time's 
registered agent had, based on the misnomer in the complaint, refused plaintiffs' service 
a short time after the statute of limitations expired, but within the time allowed for 
serving the summons and complaint.  The plaintiffs served their amended complaint 
containing the defendant's correct name about two months later. 
 Confronted with the plain language of Rule 15(c), the Supreme Court held that 
the plaintiffs' claim against Time was time-barred.0  It took the Rule's straightforward 
                     
0The Rule now provides in pertinent part: 
 
Relation Back of Amendments.  An amendment of a pleading relates back to the 
date of the original pleading when 
    . . . 
(2) the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out 
of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set 
forth in the original pleading, or 
(3) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party 
against whom a claim is asserted if the foregoing provision (2) is 
satisfied and, within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for service of the 
summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment (A) has 
received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will 
not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (B) knew or 
should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the 
proper party, the action would have been brought against the party. 
 
FED. R. CIV. PROC. 15(c).  The time period provided by Rule 4(m) is 120 days, subject to 
extensions for good cause shown.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m). 
0The Rule as it existed then provided that "`[a]n amendment changing the party against 
whom a claim is asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, 
the period provided by law for commencing the action against him, the party to be brought 
in by amendment (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that he will 
not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have 
known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action 
would have been brought against him.'" Schiavone, 477 U.S. at 24 n.5, 106 S. Ct. 2381 n.5 
(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) (1990)) (emphasis supplied). 
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text to mean that the plaintiffs could not relate back the amendment of the defendant's 
name on the complaint unless the "new" defendant had notice of the suit prior to the 
expiration of the statute of limitations.  See 477 U.S. at 30, 106 S. Ct. at 2384 ("We do 
not have before us a choice between a `liberal' approach toward Rule 15(c), on the one 
hand, and a `technical' interpretation of the Rule, on the other hand.  The choice, 
instead, is between recognizing or ignoring what the Rule provides in plain language. We 
accept the Rule as meaning what it says."). 
 The Supreme Court recognized the spartan and admittedly arbitrary consequences 
of its holding and, acting on the recommendation of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 
and the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference 
of the United States, soon thereafter recommended the aforementioned amendment to Rule 
15(c), which Congress approved.  The advisory committee, whose notes are accorded 
significant weight, see Schiavone, 477 U.S. at 31, 106 S. Ct. at 2385, explained that the 
new rule was designed 
to prevent parties against whom claims are made from taking unjust advantage of 
otherwise inconsequential pleading errors to sustain a limitations defense.
. . . 
 Paragraph (c)(3) . . . has been revised to change the result in Schiavone 
v. Fortune, supra, with respect to the problem of a misnamed defendant.  An 
intended defendant who is notified of an action within the period allowed by 
Rule 4(m) for service of a summons and complaint may not under the revised rule 
defeat the action on account of a defect in the pleading with respect to the 
defendant's name, provided that the requirements of clauses (A) and (B) have 
been met.  If the notice requirement is met within the Rule 4(m) period, a 
complaint may be amended at any time to correct a formal defect such as a 
misnomer or misidentification.  On the basis of the text of the former rule, the 
Court reached a result in Schiavone v. Fortune that was inconsistent with the 
liberal pleading practices secured by Rule 8. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 15, advisory committee note -- 1991 amendment. 
 The fact that the result the Supreme Court reached in Schiavone led it shortly 
to amend the Rule is a sure reminder of the liberality of federal pleading practices.  
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This liberality is expressed throughout the Rules0 and is enshrined in a long and distin
guished history.0 
A.  Retrospective Operation of the 1991 Amendment 
 Since Lundy conceded that the old Rule 15(c), which was in effect at the time he 
filed his complaint, would have barred his action against Dr. Carlino and Dr. Carli
                     
0See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 1 ("These rules . . . shall be construed and administered to 
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." (emphasis 
supplied)); id. 8(f) ("All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice." 
(emphasis supplied)); id. 61 ("The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard 
any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the 
parties." (emphasis supplied)). 
0See, e.g., Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 316, 108 S. Ct. 2405, 2408 
(1988) ("[T]he requirements of the rules of procedure should be liberally construed and 
. . . `mere technicalities' should not stand in the way of consideration of a case on its 
merits[.]"); Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 373, 86 S. Ct. 845, 851 ("If 
rules of procedure work as they should in an honest and fair judicial system, they not 
only permit, but should as nearly as possible guarantee that bona fide complaints be 
carried to an adjudication on the merits."), reh'g denied, 384 U.S. 915, 86 S. Ct. 1333 
(1966); Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181, 83 S. Ct. 227, 230 (1962) ("It is too late in 
the day and entirely contrary to the spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for 
decisions on the merits to be avoided on the basis of . . . mere technicalities."); 
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48, 78 S. Ct. 99, 103 (1957) ("The Federal Rules [of Civil 
Procedure] reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by 
counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of 
pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits."); Maty v. Grasselli Chem. Co.
303 U.S. 197, 200, 58 S. Ct. 507, 509 (1938) ("Pleadings are intended to serve as a means 
of arriving at fair and just settlements of controversies between litigants.  They should 
not raise barriers which prevent the achievement of that end."); see also 2A JAMES W
& JO D. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 8.02, at 8-10 (2d ed. 1994) ("The real importance of 
the pleading rules is that they make pleadings, in and of themselves, relatively unimpor
tant.  Cases are to be decided on the merits."); 2 id. ¶ 1.13[1], at 1-59 ("[Rule 1] sets 
a theme of liberality in the application of the procedural rules and fosters the principle 
that the outcome of cases should turn on their merits rather than on technical issues of 
pleading and procedure."); 3 id. § 15.15[2], at 15-146 ("The general philosophy of the 
pleading rules is that they should give fair notice, should be liberally construed, be 
subject to liberal amendment, and that decisions should be on the merits and not on 
technical niceties of pleading." (footnotes omitted)); 5 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. M
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §1286, at 558-59 (2d ed. 1990) ("[A]n inadvertent mistake in a 
pleading will not be held against the pleader if another party has not been misled by the 
mistake or otherwise prejudiced."); 4 id. § 1029, at 118 ("The federal rules are designed 
to discourage battles over mere form and to sweep away needless procedural controver
that either delay a trial on the merits or deny a party his day in court because of 
technical deficiencies."). 
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P.A. (collectively "the Carlinos"), the first question I must consider is whether the 
amendment  
applies retrospectively to cases pending in the district court at the time the amendment 
became effective. 
 Most courts of appeals have held that the amendment should normally operate 
retrospectively.  See Woods v. Indiana University-Purdue University at Indianapolis
F.2d 880, 886 (7th Cir. 1993); Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 778, 783 n.17 (11th Cir. 
1993); Skoczylas v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 961 F.2d 543, 545-46 (5th Cir. 1992); 
v. United States Postal Serv., 961 F.2d 153, 155-56 (11th Cir. 1992); Bayer v. United 
States Dep't of Treasury, 956 F.2d 330, 334-35 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The Supreme Court, as 
authorized by the Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2074 (Supp. 1993), ordered the amended rule 
to be applied to all pending cases if "just and practicable."0  There certainly is no 
practicability objection to its retrospective operation. Thus the only remaining question 
is whether it would be "just" to apply the rule retrospectively. 
 Without oversimplifying, the justice of retrospective operation has already 
largely been accounted for in the context of Rule 15(c)(3) by the very terms of the Rule.  
That is, insofar as the Rule demands an inquiry into "prejudice" to and "knowledge" of the 
                     
0Specifically, the Supreme Court's order states that the amendments to the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure "shall take effect on December 1, 1991, and shall govern all 
proceedings in civil actions thereafter commenced and, insofar as just and practica
all proceedings in civil actions then pending." Order Re: Amendments to Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 111 S. Ct. Preface 813 (April 30, 1991) (emphasis supplied).  Congress 
delegated to the Supreme Court the authority to make changes in the Rules retrospec
 
[Proposed rules of the Supreme Court] shall take effect no earlier than December 
1 of the year in which such rule is [transmitted to Congress] unless otherwise 
provided by law.  The Supreme Court may fix the extent such rule shall apply to 
proceedings then pending, except that the Supreme Court shall not require t
application of such rule to further proceedings then pending to the extent that, 
in the opinion of the court in which such proceedings are pending, the 
application of such rule in such proceedings would not be feasible or would work 
injustice, in which event the former rule applies. 
 
20 U.S.C.A. § 2074(a) (Supp. 1993). 
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party to be added, it is safe to dispense with the justness inquiry at the retrospectivity 
stage of the analysis.  See Woods, 996 F.2d at 886.  Simply put, if the party to be added 
had notice and is not prejudiced, and knew or should have known that it was an intended 
party, it would not be unjust to apply the new rule retrospectively to that party.  These 
considerations lead me to conclude that Rule 15(c) retrospectively applies to this case.
 
B.  Application of the Amended Rule 
 For an amendment to relate back under Rule 15(c), the party seeking the 
amendment must show that "the party to be brought in by amendment (A) has received such 
notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in 
maintaining a defense on the merits, and (B) knew or should have known that, but for a 
mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought 
against the party."  FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(3) (emphasis supplied).  Although the majority 
dismisses Lundy's complaint against the Carlinos on the "mistake" prong, I will in the 
                     
0Only two courts of appeals' decisions have declined to apply the amendment to Rule 15(c) 
retrospectively, Diaz v. Shallbetter, 984 F.2d 850, 853 (7th Cir. 1993) and Freund v. 
Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc., 956 F.2d 354, 363 (1st Cir. 1992).  But in Woods, a different 
panel of the Seventh Circuit determined to give effect to the Supreme Court's directive to 
apply the amended Rule to all pending cases "insofar as just and practicable" by 
essentially confining Diaz to cases in which the district court had dismissed the entire 
complaint prior to the effective date of the amendment.  The court of appeals held that 
Rule 15(c) would apply retrospectively to all cases pending in the district courts on 
December 1, 1991.  996 F.2d at 885-86. 
 Freund was decided as it was by virtue of its odd assortment of facts, in light 
of which retrospective operation would have worked a "manifest injustice."  The court of 
appeals emphasized that (1) the plaintiff had lost a full jury trial involving almost the 
same issues against some other defendants and there was no reason to think a second 
trial's outcome would differ; and (2) it would likely have concluded its appellate review 
before the amendment took effect on December 1, 1991 had the plaintiff presented his 
"weak" arguments on appeal "in a more forthright manner."  956 F.2d at 363. 
 The common thread coursing through both Diaz and Freund is the fact that 
proceedings in the district court had terminated prior to the effective date of the 
amendment.  Since this special circumstance is missing here, even assuming Diaz and 
are persuasive, they are inapposite. 
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interest of thoroughness discuss notice and prejudice in proper order and then turn to the 
question of what the Carlinos knew or should have known. 
 
1.  Did the Carlinos Receive Adequate Notice? 
 The question whether the Carlinos received adequate notice is comprised of two 
subissues:  (i) may notice by a co-defendant ever satisfy the notice requirement of Rule 
15(c)? and (ii) was there in fact sufficient notice to the Carlinos within the 120-
extension that Lundy had instituted an action? 
 The interesting notice issue in this case is whether notice can be supplied by 
an original defendant who files a cross-claim against the newly named defendant; in 
general, the question is whether the plaintiff must actually serve a summons and complaint 
on the newly named defendant before the expiration of the 120 day period.  I believe, 
contrary to the decision by the district court, that the fact that the Carlinos rec
notice from a third party should not be dispositive, "since it is unwise to place undue 
emphasis on the particular way in which notice is received."  6 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR 
MILLER & MARY K. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1497, at 93 (2d ed. 1990). 
 This Court has seldom spoken on the meaning of "notice" in context of Rule 
15(c).  We have held that notice of the institution of the action implies more than notice 
of the event giving rise to the cause of action, Bechtel v. Robinson, 886 F.2d 644, 652 
n.12 (3d Cir. 1989), and that much cannot be doubted as Rule 15(c) by its terms requires 
"notice of the institution of the action" (emphasis supplied).  A strict interpretation of 
notice was rendered under the pre-1991 incarnation of Rule 15(c) in Williams v. Army & Air 
Force Exchange Service, 830 F.2d 27 (3d Cir. 1987), in which the plaintiff had filed a 
Title VII complaint against a federal agency rather than its head.  This Court stated in a 
footnote that plaintiff's inquiries with the defendant agency did not place it on "notice" 
"[b]ecause only service constitutes notice."  830 F.2d at 30 n.2 (emphasis supplied).
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 I think service by a third party defendant satisfies even the strict standard of 
Williams, assuming that part of the case remains good law after the 1991 amendment and in 
light of its possible inconsistency with the earlier case of Varlack v. SWC Caribbean, 
Inc., 550 F.2d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 1977).  All that matters according to the terms of the 
Rule is satisfactory notice that the plaintiff has instituted an action, not actual 
service naming the defendant.  See Varlack, 550 F.2d at 175 (holding that the district 
court did not commit clear error when it held defendant had adequate notice of the lawsuit 
when he coincidentally saw a copy of the complaint naming both the restaurant where he was 
a manager and an unknown employee as defendants within the limitations period, because he 
knew that the "unknown employee" referred to him); 6A WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1498, at 129-30 (arguing in context of third-party practice like that involved 
here that "the better practice is to determine the propriety of amendment in light of the 
Rule 15(c) notice requirements"). 
 The language of amended Rule 15(c) and the advisory committee's notes undergird 
my view.  Had the drafters of Rule 15(c) contemplated that only actual service with a 
complaint and summons naming the party to be added would suffice, they could have avoided 
the precise but complex language they actually used and simply provided in its stead that 
an amendment changing a party would relate back if within the period provided by Rule 4(m) 
for service of the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment is in 
fact properly served according to Rule 4.  This they did not do.  Rule 15(c) by its terms 
requires only sufficient notice such "that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining 
a defense on the merits." 
 The advisory committee note to the 1991 amendment --which, of course, postdates 
Williams -- states that "[i]f the notice requirement is met within the Rule 4(m) period, a 
complaint may be amended at any time to correct a formal defect such as a misnomer or 
misidentification" (emphasis supplied). Although the advisory committee note does not 
explicitly mention service of process, it follows from the fact that the plaintiff cannot 
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properly serve a party with process until the complaint names that party as a defendant (a 
predicate to the misnomer line of cases) that the note envisions that the plaintiff may, 
assuming appropriate notice is provided within the Rule 4(m) period, serve the defendant 
at any time, including after the expiration of the Rule 4(m) period.  That is, a party may 
amend its pleadings to add a party although the party to be added was not actually served 
by the amending party with a complaint and summons within the Rule 4(m) period. 
 Having decided that actual service by the plaintiff is not a prerequisite under 
Rule 15(c)(3), the question then becomes what notice is sufficient to convey to the 
defendant the knowledge that the plaintiff has instituted an action.  "The conclusion of a 
growing number of courts and commentators is that sufficient notice may be deemed to have 
occurred where a party who has some reason to expect his potential involvement as a 
defendant hears of the commencement of litigation through some informal means."  Kinnally 
v. Bell of Pennsylvania, 748 F. Supp. 1136, 1141 (E.D. Pa. 1990); see, e.g., Berndt v. 
Tennessee, 796 F.2d 879, 884 (6th Cir. 1986) (notice need not be formal); Eakins v. Reed
710 F.2d 184, 187-88 (4th Cir. 1983) (same); Kirk v. Cronvich, 629 F.2d 404, 407-08 (5th 
Cir. 1980) (same); Swartz v. Gold Dust Casino, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 543, 547 (D. Nev. 1981) 
("The notice of the institution of the lawsuit required by Rule 15(c) need not be 
formal.").  I need not go so far as to embrace Kinnally's liberal interpretation in this 
case, however, as the Carlinos actually received formal notice of Lundy's institution of a 
lawsuit when Trop World, within the period provided by Rule 4(m), served on them its Third 
Party Complaint with Lundy's Complaint attached to it. 
 In sum, given the close interrelationship between notice and prejudice generally 
and in Rule 15(c) specifically, at least when the newly named defendant has received 
formal notice of the commencement of the action, albeit via a cross-complaint, I conclude 
that such notice will satisfy Rule 15(c)'s notice requirement if the defendant is not 
prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits.  Cf. 6A WRIGHT ET. AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1498, at 123 ("A finding that notice, although informal, is sufficient . 
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frequently [depends] upon determining whether the party to be added would be prejudiced by 
allowing relation back under the circumstances of the particular case.").  This approach 
resists elevating technicalities over substance and defeating the policy that "`mere 
technicalities' . . . not stand in the way of consideration of a case on its merits."  
Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 316, 108 S. Ct. 2405, 2408 (1988). 
 I consider next whether the Carlinos would be prejudiced in defending against 
Lundy's tort claim. 
 
2.  Would the Carlinos Be Prejudiced? 
 The Carlinos argue in their brief that they would be prejudiced (although at 
oral argument they conceded there would be no prejudice) because their initial involvement 
in the case was simply to defend a contractual claim for indemnity and that to now "begin 
[a] defense on a negligence theory would require a completely different legal strategy as 
well as discovery and investigation, all of which [Lundy] has already completed."  Br. of 
Third Party Appellee at 8, 12-13.  Nonbinding case law would support this contention (if 
it were true):  prejudice may be established even though the defendant knows about and is 
involved in other, related actions if the defendant's lack of knowledge of that action led 
it to conduct a factual inquiry different from the one it would have conducted had it 
known of that action.  See Craig v. United States, 413 F.2d 854 (9th Cir.), cert. denied
396 U.S. 987, 90 S. Ct. 483 (1969).0 
                     
0Cf. Bechtel, 886 F.2d at 652 (holding that to show prejudice the party opposing the 
amendment of a complaint "must show that it was unfairly disadvantaged or deprived of the 
opportunity to present facts or evidence which it would have offered had the . . . 
amendments been timely" (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis supplied)), quoted in
v. Arco Chem. Co., 921 F.2d 484, 488 (3d Cir. 1990); Evans Prods. Co. v. West Am. Ins. Co.
736 F.2d 920, 923 (3d Cir. 1984) ("The principal test for prejudice . . . is whether the 
opposing party was denied a fair opportunity to defend and to offer additional evidence 
. . . ." (citations omitted)); Deakyne v. Commissioners of Lewes, 416 F.2d 290, 300 n.19 
(3d Cir. 1969) ("Prejudice under [Rule 15] means undue difficulty in prosecuting a lawsuit 
as a result of a change of tactics or theories on the part of the other party."); see also
6 WRIGHT ET. AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1498, at 126 ("[C]ourt[s] should not give 
special treatment to the careless or myopic added defendant whose alleged prejudice 
12 
 The issue of prejudice, being primarily a question of fact, should be resolved 
by the district court in the first instance.  See Woods, 996 F.2d at 886.  In this case, 
the magistrate judge was responsible for initially deciding Lundy's Motion to Add Carlino 
as Original Party Defendants.  In granting the motion, the magistrate judge rejected the 
Carlinos' argument that they would be prejudiced if added as defendants (see App. 466a
(Letter Br. of Third Party Defendant, at 2-4 (June 22, 1992))), finding instead that the 
"Carlino[s] will not be prejudiced by the amended complaint because as third party 
defendants, they have already engaged in the preparation of a defense in this action."  
Mem. Op., Civ. No. 91-3183(WGB), at 7 (D.N.J. July 7, 1992) (Rosen, Mag. J.), in App. at 
477a.  Given the overwhelming support in the record for the magistrate judge's conclu
                                                                                          
results from his own superficial investigatory practices or poor preparation of a defense.  
But at least when the facts relevant to one possible claimant do require a substantially 
different and more burdensome investigatory effort or when the initial action is not 
sufficiently serious to warrant a full-fledged investigation, a party should be able to 
rely on the statute of limitations when that claimant does not interpose his claim in 
time."). 
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sion,0 I agree that the Carlinos suffered no prejudice on account of Lundy's belated 
attempted amendment of his complaint to name them as defendants.0 
                     
0Substantial support for the magistrate judge's conclusion that the Carlinos were not 
prejudiced exists on both factual and legal grounds:  there is not a great difference, if 
any, between Trop World's third party cross-claims and Lundy's negligence claims.  The 
amounts at stake are identical because Trop World sought full indemnification.  See
22a, 23a (Third Party Complaint, First Count ¶ 2; id., Third Count, ¶ 2).  Moreover, the 
legal issues the Carlinos needed to research and the facts they needed to investigate were 
substantially the same because Trop World sought contribution from the Carlinos as a joi
tortfeasor pursuant to the New Jersey Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Act, 2A N.J. S
ANN. § 53A-3 (1993), see App. 22a (Third Party Complaint, Second Count ¶ 2), and because 
the Carlinos asserted a cross-claim predicated on the New Jersey Comparative Negligence 
Act, 2A N.J. STAT. ANN. § 15-5.1 (1993), see App. 43a-44a (Answer to Third Party Complaint 
at 4-5).  Both Trop World's contribution claim and the Carlinos' comparative negligence 
cross-claim required the Carlinos to address the substance of Lundy's complaint and to 
discover the facts underlying it. 
 There is also ample support for the magistrate judge's conclusion that the 
Carlinos had actually engaged in the preparation of a defense in the action that did not 
differ substantially from what his defense would have been had Lundy originally named him 
as a defendant.  Most importantly, the Carlinos' counsel attended all the depositions 
taken by the original parties.  See App. 140a-41a (Nurse Slusher); App. 173a-74a (Maryann 
Strang); App. 201a-03a (Dr. Greenberg); App. 233a-35a (Mrs. Greenberg); App. 246a-47a 
(Verna Ayo). 
0Of particular relevance to prejudice in a case such as this are the goals sought to be 
protected by statutes of limitations. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c), advisory committee's notes 
-- 1966 amendment ("Relation back is intimately connected with the policy of the statute 
of limitations.").  On this note the Supreme Court has informed us that 
 
[s]tatutes of limitations are primarily designed to assure fairness to 
defendants.  Such statutes "promote justice by preventing surprises through the 
revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been 
lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.  The theory is that 
even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to 
defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale 
claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them."  Order of 
R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49, 64 S. 
Ct. 582, 586 (1944).  Moreover, the courts ought to be relieved of the burden of 
trying stale claims when a plaintiff has slept on his rights. 
 
Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428, 85 S. Ct. 1050, 1054 (1965); 
National Iranian Oil Co. v. Mapco Int'l, Inc., 983 F.2d 485, 493 (3d Cir. 1992).  Since 
the exact same evidence, memories, and witnesses are pertinent to Lundy's original 
Complaint and Trop World's Third Party Complaint as would be pertinent to Lundy's Am
Complaint against the Carlinos, and since the district court was burdened with the claim 
and cross-claim already, none of the interests sought to be protected by the applicable 
statute of limitations would be abridged were Lundy allowed to amend his complaint to name 
the Carlinos as defendants. 
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 Based on the foregoing, I conclude that the elements of Rule 15(c)(3)(A) have 
all been met.  It remains to be seen if the same holds for the elements of Rule 
15(c)(3)(B). 
3.  Should the Carlinos Have Known Lundy Was 
    Mistaken About Their Identity? 
a.  Was Sufficient Notice Provided by the Third-Party Complaint? 
 In order for an amendment under Rule 15(c)(3) to relate back, the party seeking 
the amendment must also demonstrate that "the party to be brought in by amendment .
(B) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the 
proper party, the action would have been brought against the party."  FED. R. CIV. P.
15(c)(3)(B).  The mistaken identity issue here can be separated into two subissues:  (i) 
is mistaken identity limited to cases of misnomer or improper naming or does it also 
extend to cases where the plaintiff was mistaken about the identity of a separate 
defendant? and (ii) did the Carlinos know, or should they have known, that but for a 
mistake they would have been named as defendants from the outset?  The majority disposes 
of Lundy's claims without reaching the merits ostensibly because "Dr. Carlino [had] no 
reason during the relevant period to believe that the Lundys had intended to sue him."  
Maj. Op. at 27. 
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 Lundy contends that on a fair reading of Paragraphs 2 and 5-8 of his Complaint,
the Carlinos knew or should have known that the claims were equally applicable to them and 
that, but for a mistake concerning the employer of Nurse Slusher, that Lundy would have 
named the Carlinos as defendants from the outset of the litigation.  Br. of Appellant at 
37.  Agreeing, the magistrate judge ruled that within the 120-day allowance of (then) Rule 
4(j) the Carlinos "should have been aware that but for a mistake concerning the 
appropriate employer of Ms. Slusher, the initial action would have been brought directly 
against [them]."  Mem. Op., Civ. No. 91-3183(WGB), at 7 (D.N.J. July 7, 1992) (Rosen, Mag. 
J.), in App. at 477a.  The district court purported to subject the magistrate judge's 
ruling that the Carlinos should have known they were intended defendants to the "clear
erroneous or contrary to law" standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a).  Mem. Op. 
at 14-15 (App. 622a-23a); see Snow Machines, Inc. v. Hedco, Inc., 838 F.2d 718, 727
Cir. 1988). 
                     
0These paragraphs allege: 
 
2. At all times material hereto, Defendant acted, and failed to act, by and 
through its agents, servants, work persons and employees in the course and scope 
of employment. 
. . . 
4. At all times material hereto, Defendant, as the owner in possession of a 
hotel, restaurant and gambling complex open to the public, was under a duty to 
its business invitees to have proper first aid facilities and personnel 
available to its business invitees and was also under a duty to its business 
invitees to take reasonable action to render first aid to such business 
invitees, when necessary. 
5. At all time[s] material hereto, Defendant knew, and had reason to know, 
that Plaintiff had suffered a cardiac arrest and required first aid, oxygen and 
other medical attention. 
6. Defendant negligently, recklessly and carelessly failed to perform its duty 
to Plaintiff by failing to have such emergency-first aid facilities, oxygen or 
medical personnel available. 
7. Although Defendant telephoned for an ambulance to take Plaintiff to the 
hospital, it otherwise rendered no first aid or emergency medical treatment 
whatsoever to Plaintiff, despite his crucial need for same. 
8. Due to all the foregoing, Defendant increased the likelihood of harm to the 
Plaintiff. 
 
App. 10a-11a (Complaint). 
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 Laboring under what it believed to be a "clearly erroneous" standard of review 
as to the facts, the district court reversed the magistrate judge's conclusion purely on 
legal grounds.0  In particular, the district court held that Rule 15(c)(3) does not allow 
a party to add a "new defendant," but instead allows only the correction of a 
"misidentification of a defendant."  Mem. Op. at 22, 24-25 (App. at 630a, 632a-33a).  As 
developed infra at 19-19, this ruling is contrary to precedent binding on the district 
court, and the majority does not hold otherwise, see Maj. Op. at 26 n.14.  Alternatively, 
the district court concluded that a Third Party Complaint cannot as a matter of law 
suffice to put the party to be added on notice that the plaintiff had made a mistake of 
identity.  See Mem. Op. at 23-25. I have explained my reasons for disagreeing with this 
conclusion supra in Part 8. 
 The majority does not rest its conclusion on either of these two legal grounds, 
though.  Since the district court left the magistrate judge's finding of fact undisturbed 
(that is, adopted it as correct for our purposes), as the majority acknowledges, see
Op. at 28 n.15, we are to review the factual conclusion that the Carlinos should have 
known that they were intended defendants for clear error.  See Varlack v. SWC Caribbean, 
Inc., 550 F.2d 171, 174 (3d Cir. 1977) (establishing that the question of whether the 
conditions of Rule 15(c), including whether the party to be added "knew or should have 
                     
0While the district court did describe the magistrate judge's conclusion that Rule 
15(c)(3) had been satifisfied as being "clearly erroneous," see Maj. Op. at 25 n.13; Mem. 
Op. at 25, the context of the sentence leaves no doubt that the court was referring to the 
magistrate judge's conclusions of law, not his factual findings.  The majority does not 
indicate otherwise.  See Maj. Op. at 11 ("Because the district court's decision regardin
Rule 15(c) was based on the court's interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, we exercise plenary review of this decision . . . .").  I am puzzled, then, by 
the majority's assertion that it owes "no deference" to the magistrate judge's find
fact.  See Maj. Op. at 25 n.13.  Insofar as the district court adopted (that is, did not 
disapprove of) the magistrate judge's findings of fact, we review them for clear error.  
That is, while the district court may review the magistrate judge's findings of fact 
novo under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), an appellate court may not, for the 
obvious reason that we are reviewing the district court's, not the magistrate judge's, 
findings of fact, and such review is governed by the clearly erroneous standard. 
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known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action 
would have been brought against him," have been met is a question of fact subject to 
review for clear error).  Accordingly, the majority seems to be holding that the 
magistrate judge clearly erred in his finding, see Maj. Op. at 28 n.15, although it fails 
to point to any contrary evidence in the record besides the allegations in Lundy's 
Complaint and Lundy's delay. 
 
(1)  Adding a Party Under Rule 15(c)(3)(B) 
 Regarding the first issue, Rule 15(c) on its face applies to the changing of a 
party, not just to correcting a misnomer.  The plain language of the rule states that the 
requirements of Rule 15(c)(3) apply to "amendment[s] chang[ing] the party or the naming of 
the party" and therefore Rule 15(c) most clearly contemplates that changing a party can 
relate back. Since the Rule on its face draws no distinction between the two scenarios, I 
feel constrained to conclude that Rule 15(c)(3) allowed Lundy to relate back the addition
of the Carlinos as defendants.  See Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications 
Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 111 S. Ct. 922, 928 (1991) (holding that courts are to "`give 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure their plain meaning'" (quoting Pavelic & LeFlore v. 
Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 123, 110 S. Ct. 456, 458 (1989))). 
 Adding a party is essentially no different from changing a party.  The minor 
difference between the addition and the replacement of a party is whether the original 
defendant is dismissed in addition to the new defendant being added, which is not ipso 
facto conclusive as to what the defendant to be added knew or should have known concerning 
whether the plaintiff was mistaken about the newly-added defendant's identity.  Most 
courts have thus held that a new party may be added or substituted for another.0  Most 
                     
0See Garvey, 993 F.2d at 778 n.6, 783 n.17 (allowing plaintiff to amend his complaint to 
add the United States as a defendant under the Federal Tort Claims Act where plaintiff had 
initially sued individual federal officials under a Bivens theory); Fromson v. Citiplate, 
Inc., 886 F.2d 1300, 1303-04 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (allowing the plaintiff to relate back the 
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importantly, this Circuit has interpreted Rule 15(c) to allow for the addition of a new 
party.  See Bloomfield Mech. Contracting, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review 
                                                                                          
amendment of his complaint to add the two owners of a corporation which already was a 
defendant as defendants); Berndt, 796 F.2d at 883-84 (allowing the plaintiff to substitute 
state officials for the state and a state agency in a § 1983 case); Itel Capital Corp. v. 
Cups Coal Co., 707 F.2d 1253, 1258 & n. 9 (11th Cir. 1983) (allowing the plaintiff to 
relate back the amendment of his complaint to add a new defendant after the limitations 
period had expired:  "we read the word `mistake' in Rule 15(c) liberally."); Heinly v. 
Queen, 146 F.R.D. 102, 107 (E.D. Pa. 1993) ("The `mistake condition' in [the] third 
element is not limited to cases of misnamed or misdescribed parties, rather the Rule is 
widely-understood to allow the addition of new parties that were never originally named or 
described." (citing Advanced Power Sys., Inc. v. Hi-Tech Sys., Inc., 801 F. Supp. 1450, 
1457 (E.D. Pa. 1992)); Smith v. TW Servs., Inc., 142 F.R.D. 144, 149-50 (M.D. Tenn. 1991) 
(allowing plaintiff to add a separate defendant not named in the initial complaint); 
Swartz, 91 F.R.D. at 547 (holding that a "new defendant should have known that but for a 
mistake concerning identity the action would have been brought against him . . . `whenever 
a party who may be liable for the actionable conduct alleged in the Complaint was omitted 
as a party defendant.'" (quoting Williams v. Avis Transp. of Can., Ltd., 57 F.R.D. 53
(D. Nev. 1972))); 6A WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1498, at 126-29 ("The word 
`changing' [in Rule 15(c)] has been liberally construed by the courts, so that amendments 
simply adding or dropping parties, as well as amendments that actually substitute 
defendants, fall within the ambit of the rule. . . . [T]here is no justification for a 
restrictive interpretation of the word `changing' that would require a plaintiff to choose 
among defendants." (emphasis supplied)); cf. Loudenslager v. Teeple, 466 F.2d 249, 250
(3d Cir. 1972) (allowing the plaintiff to amend his complaint to substitute the personal 
representative of the decedent's estate for the decedent); see also 6A WRIGHT ET AL.,
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1498, at 103-04 (stating that Rule 15(c) "alters the general rule 
that new parties . . . cannot be added to an action by amendment after the applicable 
limitations period has expired" (emphasis supplied)), cited with approval in Bloomfield 
Mech. Contracting, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 519 F.2d 1257, 1262 
(3d Cir. 1975); Dandrea v. Malsbary Mfg. Co., 839 F.2d 163, 166 (3d Cir. 1988) (deciding 
whether plaintiff's amendment changed the party or merely updated the party's name); 
Mitchell v. Hendricks, 68 F.R.D. 564 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (allowing plaintiff's amendment of 
his complaint to relate back where plaintiff mistakenly named the wrong person as the 
defendant and the newly named defendant had received informal notice of plaintiff's 
initial complaint).  But cf. Worthington v. Wilson, 8 F.3d 1253, 1256-57 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(reading Rule 15(c) to exclude naming a different party "due to a lack of knowledge as to 
their identity" rather than as to their correct name); Campbell v. Ward, 792 F. Supp. 
1150, 1153 (E.D. Mo. 1992) (same); Wells v. HBO & Co., 813 F. Supp. 1561, 1567 (N.D. Ga. 
1992) (denying plaintiff's motion to amend complaint where plaintiff had deliberately not 
sued a party whose identity plaintiff had known from the outset). 
 The many other courts to have recognized the "identity of interest" exception to 
Rule 15(c) have also necessarily held that Rule 15(c) allows for the addition of a party, 
rather than only for the correction of a party's name.  See, e.g., In re Allbrand Appli
ance & Television Co., 875 F.2d 1021, 1025 (2d Cir. 1989).  See generally WRIGHT ET AL
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1459. 
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Comm'n, 519 F.2d 1257, 1262 (3d Cir. 1975) (explaining, in the context of the addition
other parties, that the purpose of Rule 15(c) "is to ameliorate the effect of a statute of 
limitations where the plaintiff has sued the wrong party but where the right party has had 
adequate notice of the institution of the action" (emphasis supplied)). 
 Allowing for the addition of a new party is particularly compelling in 
circumstances where, as here, the need for the addition was caused by the plaintiff's 
misunderstanding concerning the fact that two separate legal entities were operating 
within the same physical structure.  Certainly the separate legal entity (in this case the 
Carlinos), especially when it is not normally expected to be engaged at the premises (as 
presently is the case), has reason to know that it has not been named because of ignorance 
of its separate legal existence. That is true even more so in a case such as this where 
the plaintiff was unconscious during the happening of the relevant events and hence 
obviously could not have been aware of such legal niceties. 
 
(2)  What the Carlinos Should Have Known 
 As to the second subissue, concerning what the Carlinos knew or should have 
known, Lundy asserts that the Carlinos should have known that, but for Lundy's mistake 
concerning Nurse Slusher's employer, Lundy would have named them as defendants when he 
first filed his complaint.  I agree with Lundy that the magistrate judge did not clearly 
err.  First, Lundy's Complaint indicated that he was proceeding under a theory of respon
deat superior.  See App. 10a (Complaint ¶ 2).  Given the lax nature of notice pleading 
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure0 and the circumstance that Lundy was without 
                     
0Federal pleading rules rely only on "notice pleading."  See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (a 
complaint shall set forth "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief" (emphasis supplied)).  The Supreme Court rehearsed the 
proper role of pleadings in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48, 78 S. Ct. 99, 103 
(1957): 
 
[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in 
detail the facts upon which he bases his claim.  To the contrary, all the Rules 
20 
his faculties during the relevant time frame, it was not incumbent upon Lundy to name the 
particular employees involved and not involved in his medical emergency, the majority's 
implications notwithstanding, see Maj. Op. at 26 n.14 (apparently conceding that, had 
Lundy expressly named Nurse Slusher, the Carlinos should have known of the mistake).
 In addition, Lundy alleged that the substance of Trop World's negligence was its 
failure to provide proper first aid facilities and medical treatment.  See App. 11a 
(Complaint ¶¶ 5-7).  Thus, had Nurse Slusher and Dr. Carlino been employees of Trop World 
instead of independent contractors, anyone would immediately conclude that Trop World 
                                                                                          
require is "a short and plain statement of the claim" [, FED. R. CIV. P. 
8(a)(2),] that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim 
is and the grounds upon which it rests. . . . Such simplified "notice plead
is made possible by the liberal opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial 
procedures established by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of both 
claim and defense and to define more narrowly the disputed facts and is-
sues. . . . The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of 
skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept 
the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on 
the merits. 
 
Id. (citation substituted for footnote); see Universe Tankships, Inc. v. United States
528 F.2d 73, 75 (3d Cir. 1975) (notice pleading requires a party only to "disclose 
adequate information as the basis of his claim for relief" (internal quotation omitted)); 
see also, e.g., Quinones v. United States, 492 F.2d 1269, 1273 (3d Cir. 1974) ("`a 
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond 
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would 
entitle him to relief'" (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46, 78 S. Ct. at 102)). 
 The Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Form 9, is 
illustrative of the bare-bones allegations recommended by the Rules in a negligence 
action.  That form calls for an "[a]llegation of jurisdiction," a brief description of the 
underlying event, a brief description of plaintiff's injuries, and a prayer for relief.  
For this reason I remonstrate that the majority in effect relies on the fact that Lundy 
complied with the lax standards established by the Rules, rules designed to prevent errors 
in pleading technicalities from displacing resolutions on the merits, to argue that the 
plaintiff did not provide adequate notice.  To the contrary, I find these lax standards 
important because the Carlinos should have known that under the federal rules Lundy was 
not bound by the exact allegations or the precise theories encapsulated in his Complaint, 
and thus they could not have reasonably relied on other theories of liability, additional 
facts, or additional parties not being added later.  In sum, the philosophy of federal 
notice pleading is an essential backdrop when adjudging what a potential defendant "should 
have known," and what the Carlinos "should have known" when they were served with a copy 
of Lundy's complaint even though no employee of theirs was specifically named therein.
21 
should have known that in his complaint Lundy alleged that Nurse Slusher's and/or Dr. 
Carlino's negligence caused Lundy's injuries.  The fact that another entity was Nurse 
Slusher's employer does not take much away from the force of the conclusion that her 
employer was fully implicated in the lawsuit.  Since the Carlinos knew that they and not 
Trop World were responsible for Nurse Slusher and the medical facilities at Trop World, 
the Carlinos should have known that (1) Nurse Slusher's alleged negligence and Trop 
World's alleged negligent failure adequately to prepare for medical emergencies was the 
gravamen of Lundy's complaint (the merits of this claim are, of course, irrelevant at this 
juncture); (2) Lundy was simply confused about the employer of Nurse Slusher; and (3) 
Lundy was unaware that Trop World had delegated to the Carlinos the responsibility to 
provide medical care to patrons and guests. Had the Carlinos, charged with familiarity 
with the events of that evening, genuinely considered whether they were intended 
defendants when served by Trop World, they would have concluded "very likely," and I think 
that satisfies Rule 15(c)(3)(B). 
 In my view, no competent attorney cognizant of the federal rules reading Lundy's 
complaint and aware of the facts as known to the Carlinos would have thought the Carlinos 
were completely off the hook.  One cannot expect Lundy to have possessed the prescience to 
discover that Nurse Slusher was an independent contractor rather than an employee before
filing his complaint.  The majority does not suggest why the Carlinos could reasonably 
expect that Lundy knew this fact and was merely making a "strategic" choice not to sue the
responsible entity.  It will be when this opinion is filed that the Carlinos for the first 
time since receiving Trop World's Third Party Complaint will be able to breathe a sigh of 
relief. 
 The cases the majority relies upon are readily distinguishable.  Lovelace v. 
O'Hara, 985 F.2d 847, 850-51 (6th Cir. 1993) held that the defendant in an action under 42 
U.S.C.A. § 1983 (1981) had no reason to believe that the plaintiff would amend her 
complaint to sue him in his individual capacity because the plaintiff's original complaint 
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unequivocally "evidence[d] an intentional choice . . . to bring an official capacity 
suit." There the plaintiff had known of the defendant's identity and exact involvement in 
the events responsible for the case all along.  Moreover, the court stressed that the 
amendment would have prejudiced the defendant, since the amendment would have exposed the 
defendant to personal liability, altered the elements of recovery and defense, and 
required major changes in pleading, discovery, trial preparation, and selection of 
witnesses. Similarly, in Curry v. Johns-Manville Corp., 93 F.R.D. 623, 626-27 (E.D. Pa. 
1982) the court held that a third-party claim by the original defendant did not provide 
the third-party defendant with reason to know that plaintiff may sue it where plaintiff 
actually knew the identity of the third-party defendant and its part in the underlying 
events long before the expiration of the statute of limitations.  Those cases share the 
common rationale that, where the defendant that the plaintiff seeks to add knew that the 
plaintiff was aware long before the statute of limitations expired both of that defen
dant's particular role in the underlying events and of its separate legal identity, that 
defendant was reasonably led to believe that the plaintiff deliberately chose not to name 
it as a defendant from the outset. That rationale is inapposite to this case. 
 
b.  The Matter of Lundy's Delay in Amending His Complaint 
 Moreover, I am driven to conclude that Lundy's lengthy, unexcused delay in 
amending his complaint does not affect the analysis of whether the Carlinos should have 
known that, but for a mistaken identity, Lundy would have named them in his original 
complaint.  Although the Carlinos do not phrase it as such, they essentially argue that 
Lundy inexcusably neglected to name them as defendants for approximately eight months 
after Lundy learned that the Carlinos were Trop World's independent contractors.  See
of Third Party Appellee at 8-9, 13.0  The district court espoused a similar legal theory, 
                     
0There is no denying that Lundy was sluggish amending his complaint.  The record shows 
that on September 12, 1991, Trop World filed its Third Party Complaint against the 
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and the majority also seems to latch onto it.  See Maj. Op. at 27; Slip Op. at 23, 
of Appellant at 67. 
 Some courts of appeals specifically include undue delay as a component of the 
"should have known" prong of the Rule 15(c) analysis.  But those cases are in the main 
very different, because in them the parties to be added never had notice during the Rule 
4(m) period that they were intended defendants in the action in question, and the 
plaintiff's procrastination occurred during the limitations period.0 
                                                                                          
Carlinos.  See App. 21a-39a.  A cursory reading of the attached Contract for Medical 
Services, particularly in light of the common knowledge that medical doctors are often 
independent contractors, would have revealed to a reasonable attorney that the Carlinos 
were independent contractors who were responsible for providing nursing services at Trop 
World during the time that Nurse Slusher provided medical assistance to Lundy.  See
29a, 34a (Contract for Medical Services at 2, 7).  Moreover, on both December 26 and 
December 31, 1991, the Carlinos' counsel informed Lundy's counsel that Nurse Slusher no 
longer worked for the Carlinos.  App. 455a (Letter of 12/26/91); id. 456a (Letter of 
12/31/91).  Finally, Lundy deposed Nurse Slusher and the Greenbergs in mid March, 1992.  
Nevertheless, Lundy did not seek to amend his complaint to add the Carlinos as defendants 
until May 28, 1992, about eight months after Lundy should have known that the Carlinos 
were independent contractors, about five months after he should have known that the 
Carlinos employed Nurse Slusher, and over two months after he had actual knowledge of 
Nurse Slusher's employment situation. 
 At oral argument Lundy tried to explain away the delay by reference to his fear 
of Rule 11 sanctions.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (authorizing sanctions against parties 
asserting groundless claims).  But that does not illuminate the reason for the two-
delay after Lundy had deposed his final fact witness. Moreover, that answer does not 
explain why there was any more reason to fear Rule 11 sanctions for naming the Carlinos, 
already parties to the litigation, as defendants as opposed to naming Trop World as a 
defendant when he initiated his suit. 
0See Keller v. Prince George's County, 923 F.2d 30, 34 (4th Cir. 1991) (reasoning that 
because plaintiff did not file a complaint against the defendants before the running of 
the limitations period, although she was aware of their identity and involvement from the 
day the underlying events occurred, they had no reason to suspect that but for a mistake 
as to their identity she would have originally named them); Kilkenny v. Arco Marine Inc.
800 F.2d 853, 856-57 (9th Cir. 1986) (refusing to allow plaintiff to name the original 
defendant's subsidiaries as defendants in an untimely amendment because the subsidiaries 
had no reason to know plaintiff was mistaken about their identity: the plaintiff had been 
informed by the original defendant two years before the statute of limitations ran that 
the subsidiaries were probably the proper defendants and the plaintiff had sued the 
subsidiaries in another forum, which suit was dismissed after 14 months (nine months
before the running of the statute of limitations) for lack of prosecution), cert. denied
480 U.S. 934, 107 S. Ct. 1575 (1987). 
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 More on point is Seber v. Daniels Transfer Co., 618 F. Supp. 1311, 1313-14 (W.D. 
Pa. 1985).  There the court allowed the plaintiff to relate back his second amended 
complaint filed on August 6, 1984, to the date of his original complaint, March 30, 1984.  
The statute of limitations on plaintiff's age discrimination claim expired on April 1, 
1984.  The court found there was no "undue delay" despite the four months it took 
plaintiff to amend his complaint because "counsel underwent a contentious period of 
discovery during which it may have been difficult to identify all responsible parties and 
their positions."  Id. at 1314.  The court did not find the delay dispositive, but held 
instead that the "plaintiff here may take advantage of a rule designed to prevent overly 
technical applications of the statute of limitations where it appears that responsible 
parties will not be unfairly prejudiced in defending against an otherwise untimely 
lawsuit."  Id. 
 As the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit sagaciously pointed out in 
Anderson v. Deere & Co., 852 F.2d 1244, 1247-50 (10th Cir. 1988),0 so long as the 
defendant had notice, was not prejudiced, and should have known of plaintiff's mistake 
within 120 days of the expiration of the statute of limitations, the language of Rule 
15(c) does not distinguish between timely and untimely amendments.  See FED. R. CIV.
15(c) advisory committee note -- 1991 amendment (assuming the other requirements are met, 
"a complaint may be amended at any time to correct a formal defect such as a misnomer or 
misidentification" (emphasis supplied)).  Conspicuously absent from Rule 15(c) is any hint 
that the complaint must be amended within the Rule 4(m) period -- it speaks only of 
notice, lack of prejudice, and reason to know of a mistake within that time frame.  
supra at 10.  Obviously receipt of service after amendment of the complaint would provide 
                     
0Anderson held that the district court improperly refused to allow plaintiffs to relate 
back their amendment of their complaint to name the parent of the original defendants as a 
defendant.  The plaintiffs had learned of the parent's identity only after the limitations 
period had expired, but then they failed to seek to amend their complaint for nine months 
and waited an additional two months to serve the new defendant. 
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all three, but it is not a prerequisite.  The courts to hold otherwise neglect the liberal 
policy supporting the Rules and essentially punish the plaintiff when no prejudice or harm 
results to the defendant. 
 Rule 15(c) is subject to Rule 15(a), which provides that a court shall freely 
give leave for a party to amend its pleadings "when justice so requires."  That 
subsection, not Rule 15(c), is the correct one to deal with the delay aspect of the 
amendment.  No doubt undue delay causing prejudice could bar Lundy from amending his 
complaint to add a newly-named defendant under Rule 15(a) because in such situations 
justice would not require it.  See, e.g., Adams v. Gould Inc., 739 F.2d 858, 867-68 (3d 
Cir. 1984) ("[U]nder the liberal pleading philosophy of the federal rules as incorporated 
in Rule 15(a), an amendment should be allowed whenever there has not been undue delay, bad 
faith on the part of the plaintiff, or prejudice to the defendant as a result of the 
delay.").  This Court has often held that, absent undue or substantial prejudice, an 
amendment should be allowed under Rule 15(a) unless "denial [can] be grounded in bad faith 
or dilatory motive, truly undue or unexplained delay, repeated failure to cure defi
by amendments previously allowed or futility of amendment."  Bechtel v. Robinson, 886 F.2d 
644, 652-53 (3d Cir. 1989) (internal quotation omitted); Heyl & Patterson Int'l, Inc. v. 
F. D. Rich Housing of V.I., Inc., 663 F.2d 419, 425 (3d Cir. 1981) (same), cert. denied
455 U.S. 1018, 102 S. Ct. 1714 (1982). 
 Similar in result is Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 590 F.2d 470 (3d Cir. 1978), 
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832, 100 S. Ct. 61 (1979), in which the district court had not even 
addressed Rule 15(c) since it refused to allow an amendment under Rule 15(a) regardless of 
whether Rule 15(c) would countenance it. There we held that "[a]lthough district courts 
are required to allow amendments under the terms of [Rule 15(a)], certain factors, such as 
undue prejudice to the other party and undue delay by the movant, have been found to 
establish sufficient justification for the denial of such motions."  Id. at 492 (emphasis 
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supplied).0  That is because "prejudice to the nonmoving party is the touchstone for the 
denial of the amendment."  Arco Chem. Co., 921 F.2d at 488 (quoting Bechtel, 886 F.2d at 
652) (internal quotations omitted); see Evans Prods. Co. v. West Am. Ins. Co., 736 F.2d 
920, 923 (3d Cir. 1984) ("The primary consideration in determining whether leave to amend 
under FED. R. CIV. P. 15(b) should be granted is prejudice to the opposing party.").  But 
as discussed above, see supra Part 11, the Carlinos were not prejudiced by Lundy's delay.
 Moreover, this Court has repeatedly stated outright that unexcused delay 
unaccompanied by real detriment to the defendant or to the judiciary does not constitute 
undue delay.0 That is because undue delay refers solely to delay in the proceedings, not 
                     
0See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S. Ct. 227, 230 (1962) (holding that absent 
"undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to 
cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party 
by virtue of the amendment, futility of the amendment, etc.," leave to amend should be 
freely given (emphasis supplied)); Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1414 (3d Cir. 1993) 
("In the absence of substantial or undue prejudice, denial instead must be based on bad 
faith or dilatory motives, truly undue or unexplained delay, repeated failures to cure the 
deficiency by amendments previously allowed, or futility of amendment." (emphasis 
supplied)) (affirming district court's denial of an amendment sought three years after 
initiation of the action, at which time plaintiff already knew most of the relevant facts, 
and two years after her second amendment of the complaint, at which time she probably knew 
all the facts); see also 3 JAMES WM. MOORE & RICHARD D. FREER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶15.08[2], 
at 15-49 (2d ed. 1993) (stating that leave to amend should not be granted if the moving 
party has acted for the purpose of delay, the opposing party will be unduly prejudiced, or 
the trial of the issues will be unduly delayed); id. ¶15.08[4], at 15-69 to 75 ("The most 
common reasons for denying leave to amend are that the amendment will result in undue 
prejudice to the other party, is unduly delayed, is offered in bad faith or for dilatory 
purposes, or that the party has had sufficient opportunity to state a claim but has 
failed" (emphasis supplied, footnotes omitted)). 
0See Cornell & Co., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Comm'n, 573 F.2d 820, 823 (3d 
Cir. 1978) ("Delay alone . . . is an insufficient ground to deny an amendment, unless the 
delay unduly prejudices the non-moving party."); Adams, 739 F.2d at 868 ("The passage of 
time, without more, does not require that a motion to amend a complaint be denied; 
however, at some point, the delay will become `undue,' placing an unwarranted burden on 
the court, or will become `prejudicial,' placing an unfair burden on the opposing 
party."); Deakyne v. Commissioners of Lewes, 416 F.2d 290, 300 n.19 (3d Cir. 1969) (
not believe delay alone is a sufficient measure of prejudice[;] the element of delay is 
pertinent only to the extent that it combines with some extrinsic occurrence which brings 
about actual and significant prejudice to the opponent." (internal quotation omitted)); 
see also 3 JAMES WM. MOORE & JO D. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 15.08[4], at 15-76 (2d ed. 
1994) ("It should be emphasized, however, that while laches and unexcused delay may bar a 
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to delay in amending the pleadings.0  The animating spirit of Rule 15, in short, does not 
sanction a ruling that would punish a party for delaying an amendment to the complaint.  
See Anderson, 852 F.2d at 1248-49 & n. 15 (suggesting, though, that Rule 11 sanctions may 
be appropriate). 
 To summarize, in this case the Carlinos suffered no actual prejudice, and, the 
amendment having occurred before trial was scheduled, there was no undue delay in the 
proceedings. Hence Lundy's delay in amending his complaint to name the Carlinos as 
defendants is completely beside the point. Consequently, I conclude that the district 
court should have allowed Lundy to amend his complaint to add the Carlinos as original 
party defendants.0 
 As a final note on the delay factor, it has not eluded me that the Carlinos were 
intent on not getting themselves involved in this lawsuit.  At no time did they seek or 
receive assurances that Lundy would not add them as defendants.  For this reason, I do not 
believe the delay was material to what the Carlinos should have known:  once having been 
put on notice during the limitations period, the absence of a quick amendment did not 
them off notice.  Cf. Kilkenny, 800 F.2d at 857 (plaintiff was informed of the proper 
defendants long before expiration of the limitations period) ("A plaintiff's failure to 
amend its complaint to add a defendant after being notified of a mistake concerning the 
                                                                                          
proposed amendment, delay alone, regardless of its length, is not enough to bar it if the 
other party is not prejudiced."). 
0See Boileau v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 730 F.2d 929, 939 (3d Cir. 1984) ("[T]he delay 
exception in amending the complaint refers to delay in the actual proceeding in which the 
complaint occurs, not delay in bringing suit."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 871, 105 S. Ct. 
221 (1984); Adams, 739 F.2d at 868-69 (stating that "undue delay" refers to placing "an 
unwarranted burden on the court" and holding that plaintiff's delay in amending the 
complaint to add a new legal theory until after defendant was granted summary judgment by 
this Court on an interlocutory appeal did not constitute "undue delay"). 
0I agree with the majority's reading of New Jersey law concerning relation back of 
pleading amendments, see Maj. Op. at 27-29.  See Lawlor v. Cloverleaf Memorial Park, Inc.
56 N.J. 326, 266 A.2d 569, 576-79 (1970); Greco v. Valley Fair Enters., 105 N.J. Super. 
582, 253 A.2d 814, 815-16 (App. Div. 1969); DeSisto v. City of Linden, 80 N.J. Super. 39
193 A.2d 870, 874-75 (Law Div. 1963), and thus concur that Lundy has not brought himself 
within Rule 15(c)(1). 
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identity of a proper party . . . may cause the unnamed party to conclude that it was not 
named because of strategic reasons rather than as a result of plaintiff's mistake." 
(emphasis supplied)); Potts v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 118 F.R.D. 597, 608-09 (N.D. Ind. 
1987) (same). 
 Moreover, considering the parties' repeated and close interactions, the Carlinos 
could easily have set their minds at ease, but did not, perhaps in the hope that they 
would obtain the outcome the majority now hands them.  Hence I do not agree with the 
majority that the Carlinos' suspicions evaporated over time (even assuming that were 
relevant), or, indeed, with its hyperbole that the Carlinos "had affirmative reason to 
believe that the Lundys did not wish to assert liability against [them]." Maj. Op. at 27.
 Based on the foregoing, I would vacate the district court's order and decision 
denying Lundy's motion to relate back the amendment of his pleadings to add the Carlinos 
as original party defendants, and remand with instructions to reconsider the magistrate 
judge's recommendation using the proper legal standards. 
 
II.  DUTIES A LANDOWNER OWES A BUSINESS INVITEE IN NEW JERSEY 
 Although I concur with the majority in its disposition of Lundy's claim against 
Trop World in Part III.A of the majority opinion, I write separately to express my 
disagreement with the majority's conclusion in Part III.B that under New Jersey tort law 
Trop World would be entitled to summary judgment even if Nurse Slusher had been its 
employee.  See Maj. Op. at 16-17, 19-20.  Although the precise holding reached by the 
majority escapes me, see infra at 37-37, the majority appears to conclude that Trop World 
fully satisfied its duties toward Lundy when it called for emergency help. 
 Because I conclude that Trop World was under a duty to take reasonable 
affirmative steps to assist Lundy when he suffered a cardiac arrest in addition to 
summoning emergency care, a position the majority at points appears to accept 
hypothetically to be the law, see Maj. Op. at 15-16, 20, I do not believe that New 
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Jersey's Good Samaritan Act, 2A N.J. STAT. ANN. § 62A-1, would shield Trop World (according 
to the majority's hypothetical) from liability were it Nurse Slusher's employer, or the 
Carlinos from liability had they effectively been made defendants in this case.  I also 
believe that the question whether Nurse Slusher behaved reasonably under the circum
when she refused to retrieve the intubation kit from her office when Dr. Greenberg 
requested it is a question a jury should answer. 
 
A.  General Principles of New Jersey Tort Law 
 Absent a duty, a party cannot be held liable for negligent conduct under 
principles of New Jersey negligence law. See Weinberg v. Dinger, 106 N.J. 469, 524 A.2d 
366, 373-74 (1987).  In New Jersey, the question whether a duty exists is a matter of law 
and rests largely on questions of fairness and public policy.  Cheng Lin Wang v. Allstate 
Ins. Co., 125 N.J. 2, 592 A.2d 527, 534 (1991); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 544, 476 
A.2d 1219, 1222 (1984).  "`The inquiry involves a weighing of the relationship of the 
parties, the nature of the risk, and the public interest in the proposed solution.'"  
Lin Wang, 592 A.2d at 534 (quoting Kelly, 96 N.J. at 544, 476 A.2d at 1222).  I bear in 
mind that the New Jersey Supreme Court values flexibility, see Wytupeck v. Camden, 25 N.J. 
450, 462, 136 A.2d 887 (1957), and that in New Jersey the question whether or not a duty 
exists will depend on the facts of each case, Chen Lin Wang, 592 A.2d at 534. 
 New Jersey has set the standard of care a landowner owes another based on the 
relationship or status between the parties.  See Snyder v. I. Jay Realty Co., 30 N.J. 303, 
153 A.2d 1, 5 (1959).  New Jersey distinguishes among invitees, who "first come by 
invitation, express or implied;" licensees, "who are not invited but whose presence is 
suffered;" and trespassers, who "are neither invited nor suffered."  Id. (internal 
quotations omitted).  All parties agree that Lundy was a business invitee. See Br. of 
Appellant at 17; Br. of Appellee at 13.  With this background in mind, I will tackle the 
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formidable question whether a jury could find that the Carlinos (or Trop World, assuming 
it was Nurse Slusher's employer) breached a standard of care they owed to Lundy.0 
B.  Duties Arising from the Landowner-Invitee Relationship 
 Neither the parties nor I have found any decision by the New Jersey Supreme 
Court, or any other New Jersey court, treating the question presented, namely, the scope 
of a business' duty, if any, to aid or assist a business invitee when an invitee requires 
emergency aid through no fault of the landowner.0  In this predicament I cannot help but 
resort to treatises and decisions in sister jurisdictions to divine how the New Jersey 
Supreme Court would rule, keeping in mind its general policies toward tort liability.
 As the majority notes, the early common law of England, later transposed to the 
United States, did not recognize a duty to rescue or assist another who was too ill to 
take care of him-or herself.  A sense of rugged individualism combined with the harsh 
realities of industrialization formed an impenetrable shield of immunity around all who 
failed to help, even those who could, with the greatest of ease, prevent the most violent 
                     
0I note that Lundy has not proffered any evidence that Trop World advertised the 
availability of medical services on the premises and that he patronized Trop World on that 
basis.  Thus the majority does not consider to what extent, if any, these factors would 
influence the analysis of Trop World's duties or the application of New Jersey's Good 
Samaritan Act.  On a similar note, Lundy has also not claimed he was an intended third 
party beneficiary of the contract formed between Trop World and the Carlinos, and so that 
issue is not before this Court either. 
0In Adamowicz v. Claridge at Park Place, Inc., 522 N.Y.S.2d 884, 135 A.D.2d 769 (1987), 
the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, purported to apply New Jersey law when it 
held in a case much like this one that a casino/hotel owed "no duty, either at common law 
or by statute, rule, or code, . . . to render aid to a sick patron."  522 N.Y.S.2d at 885.  
The court, however, did not bother to cite a single New Jersey statute or case, or, for 
that matter, any sister state's law or other legal authority in support of its conclusion.  
Such "authority" is singularly unpersuasive. 
0Cf. Moody v. Security Pac. Business Credit, Inc., 971 F.2d 1056, 1063 (3d Cir. 1992) 
("[w]here Pennsylvania law is silent, we may look to the law in other jurisdictions"); 
Pennsylvania Glass Sand, 652 F.2d at 1167 (we may consider "[t]he policies underlying the 
applicable legal doctrines, the doctrinal trends indicated by these policies, and the 
decisions of other courts," and may additionally "consult treatises, the Restatement, and 
the works of scholarly commentators"); McKenna v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 622 F.2
657, 663 (3d Cir. 1980) ("In sum, a federal court attempting to forecast state law must 
consider relevant state precedents, analogous decisions, considered dicta, scholarly 
works, and any other reliable data."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 976, 101 S. Ct. 387 (1980).
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and senseless of deaths.  Over the years, as commentators decried these decisions as 
revolting and an outrage to the moral conscience, courts worked widening inroads on that 
antiquated and perverse doctrine. 
 The clearly prevailing view today is that social policy justifies the imposi
of a duty to act if one of a burgeoning group of special relationships exists between the 
parties.  See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 373-76 (5th ed. Lawyers 
ed. 1984); 3 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.6, at 718-21 (2d ed. 1986).  Absent 
such a special relationship, the unquestionably widely prevailing view still is that there 
is no duty to rescue the helpless.  See, e.g., REST.2D TORTS § 314 & cmt. c (1965).  
generally Jay Silver, The Duty to Rescue:  A Reexamination and Proposal, 26 WM. & MARY 
REV. 423 (1985). 
 The special relationship bearing on this case is that between a business and an 
invitee.  See supra at 29.  The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A0 succinctly explains 
the business' duty in that context: 
(1) A common carrier is under a duty to its passengers to take reasonable 
action 
(a) to protect them against unreasonable risk of physical harm, and
(b) to give them first aid after it knows or has reason to know that 
they are ill or injured, and to care for them until they can be cared for 
by others. 
. . . 
(3) A possessor of land who holds it open to the public is under a similar 
to members of the public who enter in response to his invitation. 
REST.2D TORTS § 314A (emphasis supplied).  The essential imperative to be drawn from this 
language is the directive of "reasonable action." 
 Contrary to the apparent holding of the majority, see infra at 37-37, I deduce 
from the case law that "reasonable action" may exceed the mere summoning of emergency 
                     
0Section 314A has met with astounding success:  the great majority of the cases mentioned 
in this section handed down after 1965 adopt it or cite it with approval.  Incidentally, 
the lone published New Jersey case to reference § 314A, albeit tangentially, did so 
approvingly.  See McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, 403 A.2d 500, 509 (Law Div. 
1979). 
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care.  The modern, general common law recognizes that, where the law imposes a duty to 
rescue, in harmony with general principles of negligence law it demands of those subject 
to the duty reasonable care under the circumstances.  See KEETON ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS
at 377.  For example, one renowned commentator writes that the one owing the duty "will 
seldom be required to do more than give such first aid as he reasonably can, and take 
reasonable steps to turn the sick person over to a doctor or to those who will look after 
him until one can be brought."  Ibid. (emphasis supplied); accord REST.2D TORTS § 314A cmt. 
f.0 
 Based on these sources, I believe that the New Jersey Supreme Court would 
recognize that a business owes its invitees a duty thus circumscribed.  But I cannot 
canvass only learned works, but must sojourn forth beyond New Jersey's frontiers to survey 
its sister jurisdictions in order to gain a sense of how this duty has played out in 
similar situations.  Though I have located no case on all fours with the one sub judice
the cases I have found generally support the views of the commentators and the Restatement 
quoted above, and many are close enough to provide fruitful guidance.  I enumerate them in 
the margin.0 
                     
0Comment f to § 314A of the Restatement provides: 
 
The defendant . . . is not required to take any action beyond that which is 
reasonable under the circumstances.  In the case of an ill or injured person, he 
will seldom be required to do more than give such first aid as he reasonably 
can, and take reasonable steps to turn the sick man over to a physician, or to 
those who will look after him and see that medical assistance is obtained.
 
REST.2D (TORTS) § 314A cmt. f (emphasis supplied); see id. illus. 1, 5, 7. 
0An early landmark decision departing from the traditional hesitation by courts to impose 
an affirmative legal duty to act was handed down by the Minnesota Supreme Court in the 
celebrated case of Depue v. Flateau, 100 Minn. 299, 111 N.W. 1,3 (1907) (holding that the 
defendant, who was visited by a business-invitee who took ill during his visit, owed the 
invitee a duty to take reasonable steps to assure the plaintiff's well-being if the 
defendant appreciated plaintiff's condition; to satisfy his duty, the defendant need not 
necessarily have entertained the plaintiff through the night -- although if reasonable 
under the circumstances he should have -- but had only to do what was reasonably possible 
given the situation, such as contacting his neighbors or summoning care).  Courts have in 
the time since imposed other reasonable obligations besides summoning aid on business
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See, e.g., Estate of Starling v. Fisherman's Pier, Inc., 401 So.2d 1136, 1138 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1981) (holding in a case where a proprietor had knowingly left an inebriated man 
lying alone and unconscious on a pier near the water that a proprietor has a duty to 
safeguard a customer upon its premises whom it knows is exposed to extreme hazards, even 
if the customer brought the hazard upon himself; the customer had fallen into the ocean 
and drowned), petition denied, 411 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1981); Lloyd v. S.S. Kresge Co.
Wis.2d 296, 270 N.W.2d 423, 426 (Ct. App. 1978) (holding that a business which, although 
it was freezing cold outside, refused to let a customer it knew or should have known to be 
ill remain in the store for ten minutes after closing while she waited for her ride, could 
be liable for negligence because it had to take reasonable steps to shelter a customer); 
L.S. Ayres & Co. v. Hicks, 220 Ind. 86, 40 N.E.2d 334, 336-38 (holding that, while a 
business must not attend a dangerous instrumentality on its premises, a business must must 
act reasonably once alerted to the danger of an ongoing injury to an invitee if the 
aggravation of the injury is caused by the business' instrumentality, although the fact of 
the injury cannot be attributed to any negligence on its part; a child had fallen and 
caught his fingers between the steps and comb on the floor at the base of an escalator), 
reh'g denied, 220 Ind. 98, 41 N.E.2d 195 (1942); Connelly v. Kaufmann & Baer Co., 349 Pa. 
261, 37 A.2d 125, 127 (1944) (same). 
 Faced with scenarios evoking the duty actually to provide medical care, courts 
have consistently imposed on a business a standard of care satisfied by reasonable steps 
to summon medical aid and take other reasonable action to ameliorate the injury, but no 
more.  See, e.g., Applebaum v. Nemon, 678 S.W.2d 533, 535-37 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (holding 
that the daycare-child relationship imposed upon the daycare a common law duty "to render 
reasonable assistance to a child in its custody who becomes imperiled" and that "[i]n most 
circumstances the defendant will not be required to do more than administer whatever 
initial aid he reasonably can and knows how to do, and take reasonable steps to place the 
injured person in the hands of a competent physician" (emphasis supplied); the daycare 
center was not obligated to have present medically trained employees who could administer 
CPR, a relatively simple first aid technique to learn and administer, or other medical 
assistance in times of emergency, and it had no duty to train its employees to deal with a 
medical emergency effectively); see also Baca v. Baca, 81 N.M. 734, 472 P.2d 997, 1001
(Ct. App. 1970) (holding that a bar which had turned a customer injured in a bar room 
brawl over to the police's custody as a drunk without troubling to inform them of his 
serious injuries may have breached its "duty to take reasonable care of him").  A common 
contemporary occurrence in which courts have directly addressed whether a business is 
required to provide minimal first aid -- typically the Heimlich Maneuver -- or whether its 
duty is satisfied simply by taking reasonable steps such as promptly calling for emergency 
help is in restaurant choking cases.  Although, like CPR, the Heimlich Maneuver is a 
relatively simple yet astonishingly successful emergency technique, influenced by the 
infrequency of fatal chokings and the rapid employee turnover common to restaurant work, 
the clear majority rule is that there is no duty to provide emergency treatment.  See
v. LeJay's Sportsmen's Cafe, Inc., 806 P.2d 301, 305-06 (Wyo. 1991); Coccarello v. Round 
Table of Coral Gables, Inc., 421 So.2d 194, 195 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (per curiam); 
Parra v. Tarasco, Inc., 230 Ill. App. 3d 819, 595 N.E.2d 1186, 1188, 1192-93 (1992) 
(relying on a statute shielding restaurants from liability for failing to so aid choking 
patrons); Breaux v. Gino's, Inc., 153 Cal. App. 3d 379, 200 Cal. Rptr. 260, 261-62 (1984) 
(same); Acosta v. Fuentes, 150 Misc.2d 1013, 571 N.Y.S.2d 666, 667-68 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
(same).  But see City Nat'l Bank v. 4000 Restaurant, Inc., 372 So.2d 1146, 1147 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (per curiam) (Anstead, J., dissenting). 
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 Although, as already stated, no New Jersey case directly on point has been 
found, some older, related decisions confirm that the New Jersey Supreme Court would 
likely announce the duties as I have described them.  The most pertinent case is Szabo v. 
Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 132 N.J.L. 331, 40 A.2d 562 (1945), in which the predecessor court 
to the New Jersey Supreme Court pinpointed the standard of care an employer owes an 
employee: 
 It is conceded that in this and other jurisdictions the law is, that in the 
absence of a contract or a statute, there rests no duty upon an employer to 
provide medical service or other means of cure to an ill, diseased or injured 
employee, even though it result[s] from the negligence of the master. 
 In our judgment there is a sound and wise exception to this rule, founded 
upon humane instincts. 
 That exception is, that where one engaged in the work of his master 
receives injuries, whether or not due to the negligence of the master, rendering 
him helpless to provide for his own care, dictates of humanity, duty and fair 
dealing require that the master put in the reach of such stricken employee such 
medical care and other assistance as the emergency, thus created, may in reason 
require, so that the stricken employee may have his life saved or may avoid 
further bodily harm.  This duty arises out of strict necessity and urgent 
exigency.  It arises with the emergency and expires with it. 
Szabo, 40 A.2d at 562 (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied); accord Lanier v. 
Kieckhefer-Eddy Div. of Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 84 N.J. Super. 282, 201 A.2d 750, 753
(1964).  The court explained that, while the foreman "was not called upon to correctly 
diagnose decedent's particular ailment," he should have known of decedent's inability to 
care for himself, and it was a question for the jury whether the employer breached his 
                                                                                          
 Equally instructive are cases that have found no breach of a duty on the part of 
a business toward its invitees.  See Traudt v. City of Chicago, 98 Ill. App. 2d 417, 240 
N.E.2d 188, 191 (1968) (holding that an airport had no duty to maintain "safety appurte
nances and appliances" which it could employ to save drowning pilots, although it was 
foreseeable if not highly probable that, given the airport's location, some plane would 
crash into the surrounding lake); Harold's Club v. Sanchez, 70 Nev. 518, 275 P.2d 384, 
386-87 (1954) (holding that a casino had no duty to commit a "privileged battery" to 
prevent an inebriated patron from riding upon an escalator, even if an injury appeared to 
be likely); Dumka v. Quaderer, 151 Mich. App. 68, 390 N.W.2d 200, 203-04 & n.2 (1986) 
(holding that a business had no duty to aid or assist a customer who entered the premi
in an inebriated condition and that the business violated no duty when it ordered the 
customer to leave, accompanied by his friends, and when it took no steps to assist him 
when it later learned that his friends had returned to the establishment, leaving him 
exposed to danger), appeal denied, 426 Mich. 861 (1986). 
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duty by simply delivering decedent to his home, where he was left helpless and alone, 
instead of to his family, a physician, or a hospital.  See id. at 562-63; accord Burns v. 
Bakelite Corp., 17 N.J. Super. 441, 86 A.2d 289, 290-91, certif. denied, 9 N.J. 335, 88 
A.2d 366 (1952).  I read Szabo and its progeny as fully in support of my view that, under 
New Jersey Law, a business has a duty to summon medical aid and take other reasonable 
steps to assist its invitees who fall helplessly ill, but not actually to prepare for such 
contingencies or to provide medical aid beyond the pre-existing abilities of those who 
happen to be present. 
 I therefore conclude that the New Jersey Supreme Court would, if presented with 
a case like this one, hold that the business owed the invitee a (preexisting) duty to 
summon medical aid reasonably promptly and to take other reasonable steps under the 
circumstances to save its invitees from emergencies beyond the invitee's or his or her 
companions' capacity to ward off, but would not further require the business to afford the 
invitee first aid or emergency medical care or equipment beyond that which happens to be 
reasonably available at the time of the emergency.0 
 As already said, I agree with the majority, in light of the arguments raised in 
Lundy's brief, that Trop World did not breach its duty to summon medical assistance 
promptly.0  But I am far less convinced that Nurse Slusher acted reasonably in refusing to 
                     
0I do not believe that the New Jersey Supreme Court would hold that Trop World had a duty 
to maintain emergency medical equipment, such as an intubation kit, on its premises in the 
first instance.  My conclusion that there is a jury question in this case derives solely 
from the observation that Trop World did, in fact, have an intubation kit on the premises, 
and hence the only question is whether it would have been reasonable under the circ
stances for Nurse Slusher to bring it to Dr. Greenberg, who had manifested his capacity to 
use it, once he requested it. This does not punish Trop World for maintaining such 
equipment on its premises, but merely implements the general negligence doctrine that one 
must act reasonably under the circumstances; the coincidental presence nearby of a 
lifesaving device is simply one of the relevant circumstances a jury may consider. 
0Even though the majority mentions Dr. Greenberg's testimony that it took about twenty 
minutes for the ambulance to arrive, see Maj. Op. at 6-7, I in no way suggest that a 
seventeen minute delay (twenty minutes less the three minutes from the time it was 
summoned it took the ambulance to arrive) before summoning medical care would be 
reasonably prompt under the circumstances: that issue is simply not before us. 
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fetch the intubation kit located close by when Dr. Greenberg requested it, enough so that 
I believe a jury should be empaneled to consider this point. 
 The pertinent facts established by the deposition testimony are as follows.  An 
intubation kit, or at least enough of the equipment to make do, was inventoried in Nurse 
Slusher's office, one floor above the pit where Lundy lay fighting for his life.  App. at 
217a (Dep. of Dr. Greenberg); App. at 153a, 154a-55a (Dep. of Nurse Slusher).  After Nurse 
Slusher arrived at the scene, Dr. Greenberg identified himself as a doctor and requested 
an intubation kit.  App. at 212a, 215a (Dep. of Dr. Greenberg); App. at 241a-42a (Dep. of 
Mrs. Greenberg).  Nurse Slusher responded that Trop World policy prevented her from 
employing an intubation kit, and she apparently misrepresented that no intubation kit was 
on the premises.  App. at 216a (Dep. of Dr. Greenberg); App. at 241a-42a (Dep. of Mrs. 
Greenberg).  Because there were two doctors and another registered nurse in attendance, 
App. at 159a, 161a-62a (Dep. of Nurse Slusher), and because the other registered nurse 
alternated using the ambu-bag on Lundy with Nurse Slusher, App. at 240a-41a (Dep. of Mrs. 
Greenberg), a jury could reasonably conclude that someone other than Nurse Slusher could 
have operated her ambu-bag while she made haste to secure the intubation kit such a short 
distance away from a dying man. 
 Of course, insofar as Trop World was under no preexisting duty to render first 
aid to Lundy in the first place, to the extent it did so New Jersey's Good Samaritan Act 
would shield it from liability (so long as it acted in good faith).  See Maj. Op. at 18
19.  Again, I emphasize that I think there is a jury question of negligence here only 
because a jury could view getting the intubation kit from the office and handing it to Dr. 
Greenberg to be a reasonable step (and hence one which would fall within its "preexisting 
duty"), as it does not encompass rendering first aid beyond the actual preexisting ability 
of anyone present in the normal course of things to perform.  That is, if the jury were to 
view that step as reasonable in light of the proximity of the intubation kit and the 
medical emergency at hand, then Trop World would have been under a "preexisting duty" to 
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take that step, and the Good Samaritan Act would not shelter its failure to do so.  
Praet v. Borough of Sayreville, 218 N.J. Super. 218, 527 A.2d 486, 489 (1987) (holding 
that the Good Samaritan Act does not immunize "one who has either a contractual, 
relational, or a transactional duty to render assistance" (emphasis supplied)).  Here, 
Nurse Slusher did not retrieve the intubator kit available to her when Dr. Greenberg 
requested it, an act which would not itself comprise the furnishing of medical care but 
which a jury could reasonably consider to be simply a reasonable step not too dissimila
from summoning emergency care. 
 I am puzzled by the majority's opinion in this respect. First, it seems to 
assume, for the sake of argument, that Trop World owed Lundy the "preexisting duty" to 
"provide such first aid prior to the arrival of qualified assistance as the [casino's] 
employees are reasonably capable of giving."  Maj. Op. at 15.  Moreover, operating under 
its hypothetical that Nurse Slusher was a Trop World employee, it assigns those same 
duties to Nurse Slusher.  Maj. Op. at 19-20.  But then it decides that Nurse Slusher's 
assumed duty "to provide such first aid" as she was "reasonably capable of giving" does 
not include running up a flight of stairs to retrieve a medical device for a doctor 
attending a critically ill patient.  See Maj. Op. at 20. 
 Although the majority does not spell it out, I surmise that it did not mean to 
say that Nurse Slusher was not "reasonably capable" of running up a flight of stairs to 
retrieve the potentially life-saving intubation kit.  Thus, it must have concluded Nurse 
Slusher breached no duty toward Lundy because, as a matter of law, it is not "first aid" 
for a nurse to retrieve a nearby medical instrument for a doctor in an emergency.  That 
conclusion, however, leaves me perplexed, even leaving aside any notion of "the greater 
includes the lesser" (that is, that the greater duty to provide reasonable first aid 
includes the lesser duty to take reasonable steps other than the provision of minimal 
emergency medical care, see supra at Error! Bookmark not defined. n.Error! Bookmark not 
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defined. (discussing cases)). I simply do not understand why the majority concludes as a 
matter of law that Nurse Slusher breached no "preexisting duty" toward Lundy. 
 Based on the fact pattern in this case, I conclude that a jury should properly 
determine whether Nurse Slusher's employer (by operation of respondeat superior) acted 
reasonably under the circumstances as described or whether it breached its duty toward 
Lundy.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority's contrary conclusion.
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 Because I believe that Rule 15(c) authorizes the relation back of amendments 
adding a new party and that the Carlinos were afforded proper notice of the institution of 
this action when served with Lundy's Complaint by Trop World in its Third-Party Complaint, 
I would reverse the district court's contrary legal conclusions and remand for its 
reconsideration using the correct legal standard of the magistrate judge's findings of 
fact and conclusions of law.  Therefore I respectfully dissent from the majority's 
judgment affirming the district court's refusal to permit Lundy to amend his Complaint to 
relate back his addition of the Carlinos as defendants. 
 I also note my disagreement with the majority's conclusion that, even were Trop 
World Nurse Slusher's employer, it would be entitled to summary judgment.  Nevertheless, 
because Nurse Slusher was employed by an independent contractor (the Carlinos), and 
because Lundy has not appealed the district court's ruling that under New Jersey law Trop 
World could not be held accountable for their conduct, I concur with the majority's 
judgment that Trop World is entitled to summary judgment. 
